Performance management and audit & feedback to support learning and innovation – Theoretical review and implications for Swedish primary care
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Fehr, Ernst & Falk, Armin, 2002.
"Psychological foundations of incentives,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 687-724, May.
- Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, "undated". "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," IEW - Working Papers 095, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Ernst Fehr, 2003. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," Microeconomics 0305010, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, 2002. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 714, CESifo.
- Fehr, Ernst & Falk, Armin, 2002. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 3185, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Fehr, Ernst & Falk, Armin, 2002. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," IZA Discussion Papers 507, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Jensen, Morten Berg & Johnson, Bjorn & Lorenz, Edward & Lundvall, Bengt Ake, 2007.
"Forms of knowledge and modes of innovation,"
Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(5), pages 680-693, June.
- Morten Jensen & Bjorn Johnson & Edward Lorenz & B.-A. Lundvall, 2007. "Forms of knowledge and modes of innovation," Post-Print halshs-00483642, HAL.
- Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, 2000.
"Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(3), pages 791-810.
- Gneezy, U. & Rustichini, A., 1998. "Pay Enough - Or Don't Pay at All," Discussion Paper 1998-57, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Gneezy, U. & Rustichini, A., 1998. "Pay Enough - Or Don't Pay at All," Other publications TiSEM 641eb9a4-f245-483b-8c01-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Uri Gneezy & Stephan Meier & Pedro Rey-Biel, 2011. "When and Why Incentives (Don't) Work to Modify Behavior," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 25(4), pages 191-210, Fall.
- George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2000. "Economics and Identity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(3), pages 715-753.
- Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
- Jonathan T. Kolstad, 2013. "Information and Quality When Motivation Is Intrinsic: Evidence from Surgeon Report Cards," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(7), pages 2875-2910, December.
- Lina Maria Ellegård & Jens Dietrichson & Anders Anell, 2018.
"Can pay‐for‐performance to primary care providers stimulate appropriate use of antibiotics?,"
Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(1), pages 39-54, January.
- Anell, Anders & Dietrichson, Jens & Ellegård, Lina Maria, 2015. "Can Pay-for-Performance to Primary Care Providers Stimulate Appropriate Use of Antibiotics?," Working Papers 2015:36, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 29 Jun 2016.
- Jonathan T. Kolstad, 2013. "Information and Quality when Motivation is Intrinsic: Evidence from Surgeon Report Cards," NBER Working Papers 18804, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2008. "Identity, Supervision, and Work Groups," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(2), pages 212-217, May.
- Arne Isaksen & Magnus Nilsson, 2013.
"Combined Innovation Policy: Linking Scientific and Practical Knowledge in Innovation Systems,"
European Planning Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(12), pages 1919-1936, December.
- Isaksen, Arne & Nilsson, Magnus, 2012. "Combined Innovation Policy: Linking Scientific and Practical Knowledge in Innovation Systems," 2012 International European Forum, February 13-17, 2012, Innsbruck-Igls, Austria 144864, International European Forum on System Dynamics and Innovation in Food Networks.
- Ogundeji, Yewande Kofoworola & Bland, John Martin & Sheldon, Trevor Andrew, 2016. "The effectiveness of payment for performance in health care: A meta-analysis and exploration of variation in outcomes," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 120(10), pages 1141-1150.
- Tore Ellingsen & Magnus Johannesson, 2008.
"Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 990-1008, June.
- Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus, 2006. "Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 5768, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, 2001. "Motivation Crowding Theory," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(5), pages 589-611, December.
- Office of Health Economics, 2007. "The Economics of Health Care," For School 001490, Office of Health Economics.
- Carpenter, Jeffrey & Dolifka, David, 2017.
"Exploitation aversion: When financial incentives fail to motivate agents,"
Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 213-224.
- Carpenter, Jeffrey P. & Dolifka, David, 2013. "Exploitation Aversion: When Financial Incentives Fail to Motivate Agents," IZA Discussion Papers 7499, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Bevan, Gwyn & Evans, Alice & Nuti, Sabina, 2019. "Reputations count: why benchmarking performance is improving health care across the world," Health Economics, Policy and Law, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 141-161, April.
- Michael Kosfeld & Armin Falk, 2006.
"The Hidden Costs of Control,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1611-1630, December.
- Armin Falk & Michael Kosfeld, "undated". "The Hidden Costs of Control," IEW - Working Papers 250, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Frey, Bruno S., 1997. "On the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic work motivation1," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 427-439, July.
- Eijkenaar, Frank & Emmert, Martin & Scheppach, Manfred & Schöffski, Oliver, 2013. "Effects of pay for performance in health care: A systematic review of systematic reviews," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 115-130.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Kirsten Bregn, 2013. "Detrimental Effects of Performance-Related Pay in the Public Sector? On the Need for a Broader Theoretical Perspective," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 21-35, March.
- Masella, Paolo & Meier, Stephan & Zahn, Philipp, 2014.
"Incentives and group identity,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 12-25.
- Masella, Paolo & Meier, Stephan & Zahn, Philipp, 2012. "Incentives and Group Identity," IZA Discussion Papers 6815, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Andrei Bremzen & Elena Khokhlova & Anton Suvorov & Jeroen van de Ven, 2015.
"Bad News: An Experimental Study on the Informational Effects Of Rewards,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 97(1), pages 55-70, March.
- Andrei Bremzeny & Elena Khokhlovaz & Anton Suvorov & Jeroen van de Ven, 2011. "Bad News: An Experimental Study on the Informational Effects of Rewards," Working Papers w0164, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Andrei Bremzeny & Elena Khokhlovaz & Anton Suvorov & Jeroen van de Ven, 2011. "Bad News: An Experimental Study on the Informational Effects of Rewards," Working Papers w0164, New Economic School (NES).
- Gary Charness & David Masclet & Marie Claire Villeval, 2014.
"The Dark Side of Competition for Status,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(1), pages 38-55, January.
- Charness, Gary & Masclet, David & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2012. "The Dark Side of Competition for Status," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt1vr4g446, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- Charness, Gary & Masclet, David & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2013. "The Dark Side of Competition for Status," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt3858888w, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- Gary Charness & David Masclet & Marie Claire Villeval, 2014. "The Dark Side of Competition for Status," Post-Print halshs-00799499, HAL.
- Marie Claire Villeval, 2012. "The Dark Side of Competition for Status," Post-Print halshs-00756045, HAL.
- Gary Charness & David Masclet & Marie Claire Villeval, 2014. "The Dark Side of Competition for Status," Working Papers 1431, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Rebitzer, James B. & Taylor, Lowell J., 2011.
"Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches to Agency and Labor Markets,"
Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 8, pages 701-772,
Elsevier.
- Rebitzer, James B. & Taylor, Lowell J., 2010. "Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches to Agency and Labor Markets," IZA Discussion Papers 5058, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, 2010. "Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches To Agency and Labor Markets," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_607, Levy Economics Institute.
- Brice Corgnet & Brian Gunia & Roberto Hernán González, 2021.
"Harnessing the power of social incentives to curb shirking in teams,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(1), pages 139-167, February.
- Brice Corgnet & Brian Gunia & Roberto Hernán González, 2019. "Harnessing the Power of Social Incentives to Curb Shirking in Teams," Working Papers 19-30, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Brice Corgnet & Brian Gunia & Roberto Hernán González, 2021. "Harnessing the power of social incentives to curb shirking in teams," Post-Print halshs-03031374, HAL.
- Brice Corgnet & Brian Gunia & Roberto Hernán González, 2020. "Harnessing the Power of Social Incentives to Curb Shirking in Teams," Working Papers 2006, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Brice Corgnet & Brian C. Gunia & Roberto Hernán González, 2020. "Harnessing the Power of Social Incentives to Curb Shirking in Teams," Working Papers 20-05, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Brice Corgnet & Brian Gunia & Roberto Hernán González, 2020. "Harnessing the Power of Social Incentives to Curb Shirking in Teams," Working Papers halshs-02483217, HAL.
- Pedersen, Line Bjørnskov & Andersen, Merethe Kirstine Kousgaard & Jensen, Ulrich Thy & Waldorff, Frans Boch & Jacobsen, Christian Bøtcher, 2018. "Can external interventions crowd in intrinsic motivation? A cluster randomised field experiment on mandatory accreditation of general practice in Denmark," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 211(C), pages 224-233.
- Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2015.
"Theory And Evidence In Psychology And Economics About Motivation Crowding Out: A Possible Convergence?,"
Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 339-356, April.
- Pierre Garrouste & Agnès Festré, 2014. "Theory and evidence in psychology and economics about motivation crowding out: A possible convergence?," Post-Print hal-00926326, HAL.
- Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2015. "Theory and evidence in psychology and economics about motivation crowding out: A possible convergence?," Post-Print halshs-01139308, HAL.
- Lina Maria Ellegård, 2020.
"Effects of pay-for-performance on prescription of hypertension drugs among public and private primary care providers in Sweden,"
International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 215-228, September.
- Ellegård, Lina Maria, 2018. "Effects of Pay-For-Performance on Prescription of Hypertension Drugs among Public and Private Primary Care Providers in Sweden," Working Papers 2018:6, Lund University, Department of Economics.
- Margit Osterloh & Bruno S. Frey, 2009.
"Research Governance in Academia: Are there Alternatives to Academic Rankings?,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
2797, CESifo.
- Margit Osterloh & Bruno S. Frey, 2009. "Research governance in academia: are there alternatives to academic rankings?," IEW - Working Papers 423, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Margit Osterloh & Bruno S. Frey, 2009. "Research Governance in Academia: Are there Alternatives to Academic Rankings?," CREMA Working Paper Series 2009-17, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Domenico Lisi & Luigi Siciliani & Odd Rune Straume, 2020.
"Hospital competition under pay‐for‐performance: Quality, mortality, and readmissions,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 289-314, April.
- Domenico Lisi & Luigi Siciliani & Odd Rune Straume, 2018. "Hospital Competition under Pay-for-Performance: Quality, Mortality and Readmissions," Discussion Papers 18/03, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Domenico Lisi & Luigi Siciliani & Odd Rune Straume, 2018. "Hospital Competition under Pay-for-Performance: Quality, Mortality and Readmissions," NIPE Working Papers 06/2018, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
- Brock, J. Michelle & Lange, Andreas & Leonard, Kenneth L., 2015. "Esteem and social information: On determinants of prosocial behavior of clinicians in Tanzania," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 85-94.
- Tanjim Hossain & King King Li, 2014. "Crowding Out in the Labor Market: A Prosocial Setting Is Necessary," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(5), pages 1148-1160, May.
- Rode, Julian & Gómez-Baggethun, Erik & Krause, Torsten, 2015. "Motivation crowding by economic incentives in conservation policy: A review of the empirical evidence," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 270-282.
- Simone D'Alessandro & Caterina Giannetti & Pietro Guarnieri, 2018. "Private vs Public incentives: an experiment on motivation crowding and social trust," Discussion Papers 2018/240, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
- Grischa Perino & Luca A. Panzone & Timothy Swanson, 2014. "Motivation Crowding In Real Consumption Decisions: Who Is Messing With My Groceries?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(2), pages 592-607, April.
- d'Adda, Giovanna, 2011. "Motivation crowding in environmental protection: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(11), pages 2083-2097, September.
- Calabuig, Vicente & Fatas, Enrique & Olcina, Gonzalo & Rodriguez-Lara, Ismael, 2016. "Carry a big stick, or no stick at all," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 153-171.
- Jie, Yun, 2020. "Responding to requests for help: Effects of payoff schemes with small monetary units," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
- Olivella, Pau & Siciliani, Luigi, 2017. "Reputational concerns with altruistic providers," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 1-13.
More about this item
Keywords
health care; audit & feedback; learning; innovation; incentives; motivation; transparency; trust;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- L84 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Personal, Professional, and Business Services
- M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
- O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-HRM-2019-07-29 (Human Capital and Human Resource Management)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:lucirc:2019_011. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Torben Schubert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/circlse.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.