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Apportionment and Districting by Sum of Ranking Differences

Author

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  • Balazs R. Sziklai

    (Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Institute of Economics and Corvinus University of Budapest, Department of Operations Research and Actuarial Sciences)

  • Karoly Heberger

    (Plasma Chemistry Research Group, Institute of Materials and Environmental Chemistry Centre for Natural Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences)

Abstract

Sum of Ranking Differences is an innovative statistical method that ranks competing solutions based on a reference point. The latter might arise naturally, or can be aggregated from the data. We provide two case studies to feature both possibilities. Apportionment and districting are two critical issues that emerge in relation to democratic elections. Theoreticians invented clever heuristics to measure malapportionment and the compactness of the shape of the constituencies, yet, there is no unique best method in either cases. Using data from Norway and the US we rank the standard methods both for the apportionment and for the districting problem. In case of apportionment, we find that all the classical methods perform reasonably well, with subtle but significant differences. By a small margin the Leximin method emerges as a winner, but -- somewhat unexpectedly -- the nonregular Imperiali method ties for first place. In districting, the Lee-Sallee index and a novel parametric method the so-called Mo ent Invariant performs the best, although the latter is sensitive to the function's chosen parameter.

Suggested Citation

  • Balazs R. Sziklai & Karoly Heberger, 2020. "Apportionment and Districting by Sum of Ranking Differences," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 2009, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
  • Handle: RePEc:has:discpr:2009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Sziklai, Balázs R., 2021. "Ranking institutions within a discipline: The steep mountain of academic excellence," Journal of Informetrics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2).
    2. Ádám Ipkovich & Károly Héberger & János Abonyi, 2021. "Comprehensible Visualization of Multidimensional Data: Sum of Ranking Differences-Based Parallel Coordinates," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(24), pages 1-17, December.
    3. Friedrich L. Sell & Jürgen Stiefl, 2021. "Missing the Popular Vote: Pitfalls in US Democracy and Reform Proposals," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 56(4), pages 237-242, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Apportionment; Districting; Gerrymandering; Compactness measures; Multiobjective optimization; Sum of Ranking Differences;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C44 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Operations Research; Statistical Decision Theory
    • K16 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Election Law

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