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Választókörzetek igazságosan?
[Fair apportionment of voting districts in Hungary]

Author

Listed:
  • Kóczy Á., László
  • Biró, Péter
  • Sziklai, Balázs

Abstract

Az új választási törvény egyik célja a korábbinál igazságosabb választási körzetek kialakítása. Ezt a Velencei Bizottság választási kódexében megfogalmazott ajánlásokhoz hasonló, bár azoknál némileg megengedőbb szabályok révén biztosítja. A szabályok rögzítik a körzetek számát, illetve hogy a körzetek nem oszthatnak ketté kisebb településeket, és nem nyúlhatnak át a megyehatárokon. Tanulmányunkban belátjuk, hogy a szabályok betartása mellett a körzetek kialakítása matematikailag lehetetlen. Javaslatot teszünk a probléma optimális megoldására elvi alapon is, vizsgáljuk a módszer tulajdonságait, majd az általunk megfogalmazott hatékony algoritmussal, a 2010. évi országgyűlési választások adatainak felhasználásával meghatározzuk a körzetek megyék közti elosztásának legjobb megoldását. Végül kitérünk a demográfiai változások várható hatásaira, és több javaslatot teszünk a korlátok hosszú távú betartására: javasoljuk a választási körzetek számának körülbelül 130-ra növelését; egy-egy felülvizsgálat alkalmával a választási körzetek számának megváltoztathatóságát; illetve a körzetek megyék helyett régiók szerinti szervezését.* Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: D72, D78, D62.

Suggested Citation

  • Kóczy Á., László & Biró, Péter & Sziklai, Balázs, 2012. "Választókörzetek igazságosan? [Fair apportionment of voting districts in Hungary]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(11), pages 1165-1186.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1343
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hans Pitlik & Friedrich Schneider & Harald Strotmann, 2006. "Legislative Malapportionment and the Politicization of Germany's Intergovernmental Transfer System," Public Finance Review, , vol. 34(6), pages 637-662, November.
    2. Stephen Coate & Brian Knight, 2007. "Socially Optimal Districting: A Theoretical and Empirical Exploration," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(4), pages 1409-1471.
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    4. Samuels, David & Snyder, Richard, 2001. "The Value of a Vote: Malapportionment in Comparative Perspective," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(4), pages 651-671, October.
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    8. Attila Tasnádi, 2011. "The political districting problem: A survey," Society and Economy, Akadémiai Kiadó, Hungary, vol. 33(3), pages 543-554, December.
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    10. Paul H. Edelman, 2006. "Minimum Total Deviation Apportionments," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Bruno Simeone & Friedrich Pukelsheim (ed.), Mathematics and Democracy, pages 55-64, Springer.
    11. Oscar R. Burt & Curtis C. Harris, 1963. "Letter to the Editor---Apportionment of the U.S. House of Representatives: A Minimum Range, Integer Solution, Allocation Problem," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 11(4), pages 648-652, August.
    12. Kóczy Á., László & Pintér, Miklós, 2011. "Az ellenzék ereje - általánosított súlyozott szavazási játékok [Minority power - generalized weighted voting games]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(6), pages 543-551.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bittó, Virág, 2017. "Az Imperiali és Macau politikai választókörzet-kiosztási módszerek empirikus vizsgálata [Empirical Analysis of the Imperiali and Macau Apportionment Methods]," MPRA Paper 79554, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Biró, Péter & Kóczy, László Á. & Sziklai, Balázs, 2015. "Fair apportionment in the view of the Venice Commission’s recommendation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 32-41.
    3. Csóka, Péter & Kondor, Gábor, 2019. "Delegációk igazságos kiválasztása társadalmi választások elméletével [Choosing a fair delegation by social choice theory]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 771-787.
    4. Laszlo A. Koczy & Peter Biro & Balazs Sziklai, 2017. "US vs. European Apportionment Practices: The Conflict between Monotonicity and Proportionality," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1716, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities

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