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Voting power apportionments

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  • Paul Edelman

Abstract

I propose apportioning the United States House of Representatives so as to equalize, to the extent possible, the voting power of the individual voter. Surprisingly such an apportionment falls squarely within the traditional apportionment paradigm and is, in a very precise sense, midway between the Hill method and the Webster method of apportionment. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

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  • Paul Edelman, 2015. "Voting power apportionments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(4), pages 911-925, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:44:y:2015:i:4:p:911-925
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-015-0869-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 1998. "The Measurement of Voting Power," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1489.
    2. Paul H. Edelman, 2006. "Minimum Total Deviation Apportionments," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Bruno Simeone & Friedrich Pukelsheim (ed.), Mathematics and Democracy, pages 55-64, Springer.
    3. Oscar R. Burt & Curtis C. Harris, 1963. "Letter to the Editor---Apportionment of the U.S. House of Representatives: A Minimum Range, Integer Solution, Allocation Problem," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 11(4), pages 648-652, August.
    4. Friedrich Pukelsheim & Albert W. Marshall & Ingram Olkin, 2002. "A majorization comparison of apportionment methods in proportional representation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(4), pages 885-900.
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