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Gerrymandering in a hierarchical legislature

Author

Listed:
  • Katsuya Kobayashi

    (Faculty of Economics, Hosei University)

  • Attila Tasnádi

    (Corvinus University of Budapest
    Eötövs Loránd University)

Abstract

We build a multiple hierarchical model of a representative democracy in which citizens elect ward representatives, ward representatives elect county representatives, county representatives elect state representatives, and state representatives elect a prime minister. We use our model to show that the policy determined by the final representative can become more extreme as the number of hierarchical levels increases as a result of increased opportunities for gerrymandering. Thus, a sufficiently large number of voters provide a district maker an advantage, enabling her to implement her favorite policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Katsuya Kobayashi & Attila Tasnádi, 2019. "Gerrymandering in a hierarchical legislature," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(2), pages 253-279, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:87:y:2019:i:2:d:10.1007_s11238-019-09704-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-019-09704-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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