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Forest Owners Motivations for Adopting Programs of Biodiversity Protection

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  • Philippe Polomé

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

The results of a survey of private forest owners on adoption of a number of current programs, that include biodiversity protection to some degree, are presented. Adoption amounts to 22% for all the programs jointly, and is shown to depend on economic, social and ethical motives, with significant crowding-out between the economic and ethical motives, but not with social motives. Adoption of each program is strongly negatively correlated to each other. Nearly no respondent adopted the Natura 2000 program. The results constitute a test of the " reputational crowding-out " theory of Bénabou and Tirole (2006)

Suggested Citation

  • Philippe Polomé, 2016. "Forest Owners Motivations for Adopting Programs of Biodiversity Protection," Working Papers halshs-01323475, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01323475
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01323475
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gneezy, Uri & Rustichini, Aldo, 2000. "A Fine is a Price," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(1), pages 1-17, January.
    2. Jean Tirole & Roland Bénabou, 2006. "Incentives and Prosocial Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1652-1678, December.
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    4. Nyborg, Karine & Rege, Mari, 2003. "Does Public Policy Crowd Out Private Contributions to Public Goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 115(3-4), pages 397-418, June.
    5. Philippe Delacote & Serge Garcia & Anne Stenger & Gengyang Tu, 2014. "Private forest owners’ participation behavior related to an incentive conservation program: a case study of Natura 2000 contracts in France," Working Papers - Cahiers du LEF 2014-02, Laboratoire d'Economie Forestiere, AgroParisTech-INRA, revised Jan 2014.
    6. Freeman, Richard B, 1997. "Working for Nothing: The Supply of Volunteer Labor," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 140-166, January.
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    8. Frey, Bruno S & Oberholzer-Gee, Felix, 1997. "The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 746-755, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Non-indutrial private forest owner; biodiversity program; motivation crowding-out; adoption decision;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • Q23 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Forestry
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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