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Strategic Voting in Sequential Committees

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  • Matias Iaryczower

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  • Matias Iaryczower, 2008. "Strategic Voting in Sequential Committees," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002394, David K. Levine.
  • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000002394
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    1. Battaglini, Marco & Morton, Rebecca & Palfrey, Thomas, 2007. "Efficiency, Equity, and Timing of Voting Mechanisms," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 101(3), pages 409-424, August.
    2. Eddie Dekel & Michele Piccione, 2000. "Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elections," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(1), pages 34-55, February.
    3. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1029-1058, September.
    4. Feddersen, Timothy & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1998. "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(1), pages 23-35, March.
    5. Battaglini, Marco, 2005. "Sequential voting with abstention," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 445-463, May.
    6. Coughlan, Peter J., 2000. "In Defense of Unanimous Jury Verdicts: Mistrials, Communication, and Strategic Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(2), pages 375-393, June.
    7. Ernst Maug & Bilge Yilmaz, 2002. "Two-Class Voting: A Mechanism for Conflict Resolution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1448-1471, December.
    8. Ernst Maug & Bilge Yilmaz, 2002. "Two-Class Voting: A Mechanism for Conflict Resolution?," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 391749000000000536, www.najecon.org.
    9. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S., 1996. "Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(1), pages 34-45, March.
    10. Nageeb Ali & Navin Kartik, 2006. "A Theory of Momentum in Sequential Voting," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 321307000000000016, www.najecon.org.
    11. Gerardi, Dino & Yariv, Leeat, 2007. "Deliberative voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 317-338, May.
    12. Steven Callander, 2007. "Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 74(3), pages 653-684.
    13. Thomas Piketty, 2000. "Voting as Communicating," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(1), pages 169-191.
    14. Austen-Smith, David & Feddersen, Timothy J., 2006. "Deliberation, Preference Uncertainty, and Voting Rules," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 100(2), pages 209-217, May.
    15. Nicola Persico, 2004. "Committee Design with Endogenous Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 71(1), pages 165-191.
    16. Ernst Maug & Bilge Yilmaz, 2002. "Two-Class Voting: A Mechanism for Conflict Resolution?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391749000000000536, David K. Levine.
    17. David Austen-Smith & Timothy Feddersen, 2005. "Deliberation and Voting Rules," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: David Austen-Smith & John Duggan (ed.), Social Choice and Strategic Decisions, pages 269-316, Springer.
    18. Ronny Razin, 2003. "Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(4), pages 1083-1119, July.
    19. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Raphael Godefroy & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2013. "Choosing Choices: Agenda Selection With Uncertain Issues," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(1), pages 221-253, January.
    2. Deniz Selman, 2011. "Optimal Sequencing of Presidential Primaries," Working Papers 2011/09, Bogazici University, Department of Economics.
    3. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/3mdje1f65o8qrqpapnmrhon2vm is not listed on IDEAS
    4. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/3mdje1f65o8qrqpapnmrhon2vm is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Izmirlioglu, Yusuf, 2010. "Voting and Information Aggregation in Parliamentary and Semi-Presidential Democracies," MPRA Paper 24686, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-00564976 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Chen, Jidong, 2023. "Sequential agenda setting with strategic and informative voting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
    8. Matias Iaryczower & Gabriel Katz, 2016. "What does IT Take for Congress to Enact Good Policies? an Analysis of Roll Call Voting in the US Congress," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 79-104, March.

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