IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/apsrev/v81y1987i04p1323-1330_20.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Sophisticated Sincerity: Voting Over Endogenous Agendas

Author

Listed:
  • Austen-Smith, David

Abstract

The empirical findings on whether or not legislators vote strategically are mixed. This is at least partly due to the fact that to establish any hypothesis on strategic voting, legislators' preferences need to be known, and these are typically private data. I show that under complete information, if decision making is by the amendment procedure and if the agenda is set endogenously, then sophisticated (strategic) voting over the resulting agenda is observationally equivalent to sincere voting. The voting strategies, however, are sophisticated. This fact has direct implications for empirical work on sophisticated voting.

Suggested Citation

  • Austen-Smith, David, 1987. "Sophisticated Sincerity: Voting Over Endogenous Agendas," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(4), pages 1323-1330, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:81:y:1987:i:04:p:1323-1330_20
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0003055400204462/type/journal_article
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Raphael Godefroy & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2013. "Choosing Choices: Agenda Selection With Uncertain Issues," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(1), pages 221-253, January.
    2. Bhaskar Dutta & Matthew O. Jackson & Michel Le Breton, 2004. "Equilibrium agenda formation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 23(1), pages 21-57, August.
    3. Andreas Kleiner & Benny Moldovanu, 2020. "The failure of a Nazi “killer” amendment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(1), pages 133-149, April.
    4. Krehbiel, Keith & Peskowitz, Zachary, 2012. "Legislative Organization and Ideal-Point Bias," Research Papers 2124, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    5. Scott Moser & John W. Patty & Elizabeth Maggie Penn, 2009. "The Structure of Heresthetical Power," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 21(2), pages 139-159, April.
    6. Gershkov, Alex & Kleiner, Andreas & Moldovanu, Benny & Shi, Xianwen, 2023. "Voting with interdependent values: The Condorcet winner," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 193-208.
    7. Alex Gershkov & Andreas Kleiner & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2019. "The Art of Compromising: Voting with Interdependent Values and the Flag of the Weimar Republic," Working Papers tecipa-645, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    8. Kwang-ho Kim, 2023. "Valence Characteristics and Split-Ticket Voting of Partisan Voters," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 39, pages 517-539.
    9. Krehbiel, Keith & Meirowitz, Adam & Woon, Jonathan, 2004. "Testing Theories of Lawmaking," Research Papers 1860, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    10. Nicholas Miller, 2010. "Agenda trees and sincere voting: a response to Schwartz," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(1), pages 213-221, October.
    11. moldovanu, benny, 2018. "A Nazi †Killer†Amendment," CEPR Discussion Papers 13260, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Andreas Kleiner & Benny Moldovanu, 2017. "Content-Based Agendas and Qualified Majorities in Sequential Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(6), pages 1477-1506, June.
    13. Keith Krehbiel & Zachary Peskowitz, 2015. "Legislative organization and ideal-point bias," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(4), pages 673-703, October.
    14. Myunghoon Kang, 2017. "Representation, sophisticated voting, and the size of the gridlock region," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(4), pages 623-646, October.
    15. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-00564976 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Dutta, Bhaskar & Jackson, Matthew O. & Le Breton, Michel, 2002. "Voting by Successive Elimination and Strategic Candidacy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 190-218, March.
    17. Evelyn C. Fink, 1995. "Institutional Change as a Sophisticated Strategy," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 7(4), pages 477-510, October.
    18. Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber, 2017. "Deciding on what to Decide," Working Papers 973, Barcelona School of Economics.
    19. Hans Gersbach & Oriol Tejada, 2012. "Channeling the final Say in Politics," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 12/164, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    20. Hans Gersbach & Kremena Valkanova, 2024. "Voting with Random Proposers: Two Rounds Suffice," Papers 2410.20476, arXiv.org.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:81:y:1987:i:04:p:1323-1330_20. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kirk Stebbing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/psr .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.