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Capital humain, risques et effets de signal

Author

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  • David Touahri

    (LEST - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Sociologie du Travail - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Dans ce papier, nous construisons un modèle de décision dans lequel le système de formation produit à la fois des compétences productives (capital humain) mais aussi de l'information sur la véritable productivité des individus (signal). Nous réévaluons dans ce nouveau cadre théorique, les effets de l'incertitude sur la demande optimale d'éducation. Nous montrons qu'avec l'introduction d'effets de signal, l'éducation peut être utilisée comme un moyen de couverture face aux risques, et en particulier contre le risque de chômage futur.

Suggested Citation

  • David Touahri, 2009. "Capital humain, risques et effets de signal," Working Papers halshs-00414277, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00414277
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00414277
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    References listed on IDEAS

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