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How the honesty oath works: Quick, intuitive truth telling under oath

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  • Beck, Tobias

Abstract

This study analyzes the workings of oath-taking when the decision about lying requires strategic thinking. In a laboratory experiment, the oath leads to more truth telling, but it does not make liars reduce the sizes of their lies. While truth tellers decide faster due to the oath, liars need more time to decide under oath. By analyzing players’ beliefs about their co-players’ mistrust, I find that the oath reduces the extent of strategic reasoning in the decision whether to tell the truth or not. These findings are consistent with the conjecture that the honesty oath works by making the decision to tell the truth less deliberate and more intuitive.

Suggested Citation

  • Beck, Tobias, 2021. "How the honesty oath works: Quick, intuitive truth telling under oath," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:94:y:2021:i:c:s2214804321000689
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2021.101728
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    3. Jiang, Shuguang & Wei, Qian, 2022. "Confucian culture, moral reminder, and soft corruption," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    4. Loessl, Victor von & Bühren, Christoph & Frank, Björn & Wetzel, Heike & Wiederhold, Elina, 2024. "Would you lie about your mother's birthday? A new online dishonesty experiment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    5. Brent J. Davis & Tarek Jaber‐Lopez, 2023. "Do voluntary commitment mechanisms improve welfare? The effect of mandatory and voluntary oaths in a social dilemma," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(2), pages 525-540, April.
    6. Akin, Zafer, 2022. "Playing the victim behavior: an experimental study," MPRA Paper 115532, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Honesty oath; Strategic deception; Truth telling; Size of the lie; Laboratory experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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