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Crowd-sourced CEO approval and turnover

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  • Chang, Sea-Jin
  • Oh, Ji Yeol Jimmy
  • Park, Kwangwoo

Abstract

This study examines how employee approval ratings of CEOs improve the predictability of turnover. Using the crowd-sourced reviews from Glassdoor, we find that CEOs with high employee approval are less likely to be removed, even after a poor performance. The decrease in turnover–performance sensitivity is particularly strong when the relative importance of employees is greater in industries of higher intangible asset intensity and in states with strong employee protection. Firms with higher CEO approval subsequently show improved performance and lowered firm-specific risk. We highlight the role of employees as a key stakeholder in predicting CEO turnover, consistent with the value creation view of stakeholder capitalism.

Suggested Citation

  • Chang, Sea-Jin & Oh, Ji Yeol Jimmy & Park, Kwangwoo, 2024. "Crowd-sourced CEO approval and turnover," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 96(PA).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finana:v:96:y:2024:i:pa:s1057521924005192
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2024.103587
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    CEO turnover; Crowd-sourced reviews; Internal stakeholders; Stakeholder capitalism; Social media;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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