IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/halshs-00998308.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Bridging the Learning Gap in the Market for Higher Education: E-learning and Public Subside

Author

Listed:
  • Adel Ben Youssef

    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur)

  • Thomas Le Texier

    (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Ludovic Ragni

    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur)

Abstract

This article aims at analyzing the adoption patterns which apply on the market for higher education when two types of learning organizations - namely, traditional learning and e-learning organizations - provide educational programs. We focus on the impact of public subsidies to e‐learning providers in order to evaluate the conditions under which the learning gap is bridged. A welfare analysis is introduced to estimate the relevance of such 'pro e‐learning' public policies. Our first results show that public subsidies enable the e‐learning organization to provide quality‐based and pricing strategies that tend to be similar to those of the brick'n mortar organization. Besides, we find that such short‐term policies positively impact on the global level of quality which is provided by both providers. Nevertheless, our welfare analysis underlines contrasted results about the relevance of such short‐term public policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Adel Ben Youssef & Thomas Le Texier & Ludovic Ragni, 2011. "Bridging the Learning Gap in the Market for Higher Education: E-learning and Public Subside," Post-Print halshs-00998308, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00998308
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00998308
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00998308/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Steven G. Rivkin & Eric A. Hanushek & John F. Kain, 2005. "Teachers, Schools, and Academic Achievement," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 417-458, March.
    2. Schneider, Andrea, 2010. "Redistributive taxation vs. education subsidies: Fostering equality and social mobility in an intergenerational model," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 597-605, August.
    3. West, Edwin G, 1997. "Education Vouchers in Principle and Practice: A Survey," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 12(1), pages 83-103, February.
    4. Hoyt, William H. & Lee, Kangoh, 1998. "Educational vouchers, welfare effects, and voting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 211-228, June.
    5. Caroline Minter Hoxby, 1994. "Do Private Schools Provide Competition for Public Schools?," NBER Working Papers 4978, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. McMillan, Robert, 2004. "Competition, incentives, and public school productivity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(9-10), pages 1871-1892, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jaag, Christian, 2006. "School Competition," MPRA Paper 339, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. David Card & Martin D. Dooley & A. Abigail Payne, 2010. "School Competition and Efficiency with Publicly Funded Catholic Schools," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 150-176, October.
    3. Cardak, Buly A., 2005. "Education Vouchers, Growth, And Income Inequality," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 98-121, February.
    4. Bearse, Peter & Cardak, Buly A. & Glomm, Gerhard & Ravikumar, B., 2013. "Why do education vouchers fail at the ballot box?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 26-37.
    5. Nirav Mehta, 2017. "Competition In Public School Districts: Charter School Entry, Student Sorting, And School Input Determination," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(4), pages 1089-1116, November.
    6. Justman, Moshe & Gradstein, Mark, 2001. "Public Education and the Melting Pot," CEPR Discussion Papers 2924, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Thomas J. Nechyba, 1996. "Public School Finance in a General Equilibrium Tiebout World: Equalization Programs, Peer Effects and Private School Vouchers," NBER Working Papers 5642, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Chakrabarti Rajashri, 2013. "Impact of Voucher Design on Public School Performance: Evidence from Florida and Milwaukee Voucher Programs," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 349-394, July.
    9. Luengo-Prado, Maria Jose & Volij, Oscar, 2003. "Public education, communities and vouchers," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 51-73.
    10. De Fraja, Gianni & Landeras, Pedro, 2006. "Could do better: The effectiveness of incentives and competition in schools," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 189-213, January.
    11. David Brasington, 2005. "School Choice and the Flight to Private Schools: To What Extent Are Public and Private Schools Substitutes?," Departmental Working Papers 2005-02, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University.
    12. Stephen Gibbons & Stephen Machin & Olmo Silva, 2008. "Choice, Competition, and Pupil Achievement," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(4), pages 912-947, June.
    13. Thomas J. Nechyba, 2000. "Mobility, Targeting, and Private-School Vouchers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 130-146, March.
    14. Cohen-Zada, Danny & Justman, Moshe, 2003. "The political economy of school choice: linking theory and evidence," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 277-308, September.
    15. Kim, Young-Joo, 2011. "Catholic schools or school quality? The effects of Catholic schools on labor market outcomes," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 546-558, June.
    16. Thomas J. Nechyba, 1999. "A Model of Multiple Districts and Private Schools: The Role of Mobility, Targeting, and Private School Vouchers," NBER Working Papers 7239, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Battaglia, Marianna & Lebedinski, Lara, 2015. "Equal Access to Education: An Evaluation of the Roma Teaching Assistant Program in Serbia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 62-81.
    18. Josse Delfgaauw & Robert Dur, 2008. "Incentives and Workers' Motivation in the Public Sector," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(525), pages 171-191, January.
    19. Dan Goldhaber & Roddy Theobald, 2013. "Managing the Teacher Workforce in Austere Times: The Determinants and Implications of Teacher Layoffs," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 8(4), pages 494-527, October.
    20. Daniel S. Hamermesh & Katie R. Genadek & Michael C. Burda, 2021. "Racial/Ethnic Differences in Non-Work at Work," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 74(2), pages 272-292, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    quality; welfare; adoption patterns; costs; e‐learning; public subsidies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00998308. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.