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L'intérêt du Balanced Scorecard dans l'évolution des modes de contrôle des Départements français

Author

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  • Jean-Noël Chauvey

    (ERFI - Equipe de Recherche sur la Firme et l'Industrie - UM - Université de Montpellier)

Abstract

Les bases de la légitimité de l'action publique ont profondément changé. Ces changements se sont en particulier traduits par une évolution des fondements du contrôle de gestion public et par le développement d'une exigence d'évaluation des politiques publiques. Les modalités de mise en oeuvre de ces nouveaux modes de contrôle et les méthodes sur lesquelles ils peuvent s'appuyer restent toutefois à définir. Cette communication a pour objet de discuter la capacité du Balanced Scorecard à faciliter l'évolution du contrôle public dans une voie plus stratégique, notamment tendue vers l'évaluation des politiques publiques. Elle s'appuie sur une analyse théorique, puis sur la revue des études empiriques existantes, et enfin sur une enquête exploratoire. Elle montre que, si l'intérêt du Balanced Scorecard dans ce contexte semble avéré, il reste peu connu et très peu souvent mis en oeuvre dans les collectivités françaises, la maturité du contrôle traditionnel et l'état des systèmes d'information ne permettant pas toujours une mise en oeuvre immédiate de ce type d'approche.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Noël Chauvey, 2005. "L'intérêt du Balanced Scorecard dans l'évolution des modes de contrôle des Départements français," Post-Print halshs-00581145, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00581145
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00581145
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mueller,Dennis C. (ed.), 1997. "Perspectives on Public Choice," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521553773, October.
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    4. Pascal Fabre, 2004. "L'évaluation de la performance des associations dans les villes françaises, entre proximité et contingence," Post-Print halshs-00593090, HAL.
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    6. David Huron & Jacques Spindler, 1998. "Le management public local," Post-Print hal-00493544, HAL.
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    Cited by:

    1. David Carassus & Damien Gardey & Christophe Maurel, 2011. "Les démarches locales de performance publique face à la LOLF : mimétisme ou innovation ?," Post-Print hal-02431106, HAL.

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