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Election campaigns, agenda setting and electoral outcomes

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  • Manfred Holler
  • Peter Skott

Abstract

Framing effects and bounded rationality imply that election campaigns may be an important determinant of election outcomes. This paper uses a two-party setting and simple game theoretic models to analyse the strategic interaction between the parties' campaign decisions. Alternations of power emerge naturally, even if both electoral preferences and party positions remain constant. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Manfred Holler & Peter Skott, 2005. "Election campaigns, agenda setting and electoral outcomes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(1), pages 215-228, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:125:y:2005:i:1:p:215-228
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-3417-4
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    1. Vesa Kanniainen, 2022. "Gallup Democracy in Exercising the NATO Membership Option: The Cases of Finland and Sweden," CESifo Working Paper Series 9876, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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