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Probabilistic Voting and Equilibrium: An Impossibility Result

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  • Kirchgassner, Gebhard

Abstract

The introduction of voters' uncertainty alone is in no way sufficient to guarantee an equilibrium outcome of a voting process. What is needed in addition is the assumption that the voting probabilities depend strictly convex/respectively concave on the utility losses caused by the proposed policies of the different parties. This assumption is, however, not compatible with an unrestricted policy space, and it has to be rejected for theoretical as well as empirical reasons. Thus, using models of probabilistic voting we still have to accept that cycles can arise and electoral outcomes are prone to manipulation via agenda setting. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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  • Kirchgassner, Gebhard, 2000. "Probabilistic Voting and Equilibrium: An Impossibility Result," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(1-2), pages 35-48, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:103:y:2000:i:1-2:p:35-48
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    Cited by:

    1. David Juárez-Luna & Christian Ghiglino, 2014. "Elite capture of democratic politics: the role of social identity," Working Papers DTE 573, CIDE, División de Economía.
    2. BRETON, Albert & SALMON, Pierre, 2002. "Constitutional rules and competitive politics : their effects on secessionism," LATEC - Document de travail - Economie (1991-2003) 2002-06, LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne.
    3. Dan Usher, 2010. "Three Papers On Bargaining," Working Paper 1239, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    4. Dan Usher, 2012. "Bargaining and voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 739-755, June.
    5. Stefan Homburg, 2011. "Colonel Blotto und seine ökonomischen Anwendungen," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 12(1), pages 1-11, February.
    6. Lars P. Feld & Christoph A. Schaltegger, 2012. "Die Politische Ökonomik der Besteuerung," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 13(1-2), pages 116-136, February.
    7. Lars Feld & Marcel Savioz & Jan Schnellenbach, 2010. "Gebhard Kirchgässner, 60 years on," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(3), pages 393-399, September.
    8. Charles B. Blankart & Dennis C. Mueller, 2002. "Alternativen der parlamentarischen Demokratie," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 3(1), pages 1-21, February.
    9. Charles Blankart & Dennis Mueller, 2004. "The Advantages of Pure Forms of Parliamentary Democracy over Mixed Forms," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 431-453, February.
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    11. Deborah Fletcher & Steven Slutsky, 2011. "Campaign allocations under probabilistic voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(3), pages 469-499, March.
    12. Pierre Salmon, 2001. "Constitutional Implications of Electoral Assumptions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 333-349, December.

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