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Nascent Governance: The Impact Of Entrepreneurial Finance On Board Formation And Roles

Author

Listed:
  • Christophe Bonnet

    (GDF - Gestion, Droit et Finance - EESC-GEM Grenoble Ecole de Management)

  • Peter Wirtz

    (Laboratoire de Recherche Magellan - UJML - Université Jean Moulin - Lyon 3 - Université de Lyon - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises (IAE) - Lyon)

  • Martine Séville

    (COACTIS - COnception de l'ACTIon en Situation - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne)

Abstract

This research is an attempt to make progress in the understanding of the process of board formation and its impact on the functions performed by the board in young entrepreneurial ventures. We study the link between board members' characteristics and the effective accomplishment of monitoring and resource provision functions. Expanding earlier research we argue that the identity of external financiers matters in configuring the board and designing its working mode and roles. This is because different investors (1) may be endowed with different skills and knowledge, and (2) their social identities influence the motivation to accomplish different roles. We present a conceptual framework of the process of board formation in entrepreneurial firms and confront it with an in-depth longitudinal case study of a young venture that has received funding from business angels and venture capitalists. We show that board composition and routines are co-constructed by different (but not all) salient stakeholders who were involved in the first input of external capital. The intended and actual role of the board members depends on their specific capabilities and financial stakes and on processes of social identification. The observation of evolving board routines shows that certain members participate in two parallel processes of interaction with the entrepreneurs. Formal board meetings essentially serve the purpose of regular monitoring, whereas certain board members contribute to resource provision in parallel informal interactions, when they strongly identify themselves with entrepreneurs.

Suggested Citation

  • Christophe Bonnet & Peter Wirtz & Martine Séville, 2013. "Nascent Governance: The Impact Of Entrepreneurial Finance On Board Formation And Roles," Grenoble Ecole de Management (Post-Print) halshs-00850021, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:gemptp:halshs-00850021
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00850021
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Amy J. Hillman & Gavin Nicholson & Christine Shropshire, 2008. "Directors' Multiple Identities, Identification, and Board Monitoring and Resource Provision," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 19(3), pages 441-456, June.
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    Keywords

    Nascent governance; board of directors; entrepreneurial finance; social identification;
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