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Diversity of Compensation Policies and Wage Collective Bargaining in France
[Diversidad de Política de Compensación y Negociación colectiva de Salario en Francia]

Author

Listed:
  • Nicolas Castel

    (CEE - Centre d'études de l'emploi - M.E.N.E.S.R. - Ministère de l'Education nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche - Ministère du Travail, de l'Emploi et de la Santé, 2L2S - Laboratoire Lorrain de Sciences Sociales - UL - Université de Lorraine)

  • Noélie Delahaie

    (IRES - Institut de recherches économiques et sociales)

  • Héloïse Petit

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CEE - Centre d'études de l'emploi - M.E.N.E.S.R. - Ministère de l'Education nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche - Ministère du Travail, de l'Emploi et de la Santé)

Abstract

The concomitant transformations of compensation policies and the wage collective bargaining system over the course of recent decades invite comparison between the two: how far are changes in pay practices and patterns of wage collective bargaining connected? How do actors bargain given complex and diverse compensation policies? These issues are examined on the basis of the French REPONSE 2004-2005 survey and two case studies carried out in the automotive sector and four call centres. Six compensation policy profiles are firstly identified, from the simplest to the most complex. Our results then emphasise that the diversity of compensation policies is echoing the variety of collective bargaining. Besides, they underline the impact of collective bargaining depends on compensation policies. Finally, we stress that several factors limit collective bargaining margins, or at least are used as such: individualisation of pay practices, directives from parent companies or contractors, as well as the statutory minimum wage.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Castel & Noélie Delahaie & Héloïse Petit, 2014. "Diversity of Compensation Policies and Wage Collective Bargaining in France [Diversidad de Política de Compensación y Negociación colectiva de Salario en Francia]," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01625986, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-01625986
    DOI: 10.5209/rev_CRLA.2014.v32.n2.46767
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.univ-lorraine.fr/hal-01625986
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Thomas Lemieux & W. Bentley MacLeod & Daniel Parent, 2009. "Performance Pay and Wage Inequality," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 124(1), pages 1-49.
    2. Nicolas Castel & Noélie Delahaie & Héloïse Petit, 2011. "Quels modes de négociation face à des politiques salariales renouvelées ?," Working Papers hal-00646434, HAL.
    3. Eve Caroli & Jérôme Gautié, 2008. "Low wage work in France," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00266332, HAL.
    4. David Marsden & Richard Belfield, 2010. "Institutions and the Management of Human Resources: Incentive Pay Systems in France and Great Britain," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 48(2), pages 235-283, June.
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