Decentralized Many-to-One Matching With Random Search
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More about this item
Keywords
many-to-one matching; decentralized matching; stability;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2024-05-27 (Economic Design)
- NEP-MIC-2024-05-27 (Microeconomics)
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