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Economic Volatility and Institutional Reforms in Macroeconomic Policymaking: The Case of Fiscal Policy

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Abstract

We evaluate proposals for independent fiscal authority put forward as a solution to excessive public spending. Our main conclusion is that moving the responsibility to set broad measures of fiscal policy from the hands of government to an independent fiscal council is not necessarily welfare improving. We show that the change is welfare improving if nature of uncertainty between fiscal and monetary policymakers does not change as a result. However, if this institutional change involves considerable decrease of capacity of the new agency to recognize economic shocks, citizens' welfare can decrease as a results. This is especially significant in times of increased economic volatility such as in a recent global financial crisis. Faced with the ambiguous theoretical result, we try to gain deeper insight by calibrating our simple model.

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  • Adam Gersl & Jan Zápal, 2010. "Economic Volatility and Institutional Reforms in Macroeconomic Policymaking: The Case of Fiscal Policy," Working Papers IES 2010/15, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Aug 2010.
    • Handle: RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp2010_15
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Saint-Paul, Gilles, 2002. "Some Thoughts on Macroeconomic Fluctuations and the Timing of Labor Market Reform," IZA Discussion Papers 611, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Gilles Saint-Paul, 2004. "Macroeconomic Fluctuations and the Timing of Labour-Market Reform," International Economic Association Series, in: Robert M. Solow (ed.), Structural Reform and Economic Policy, chapter 7, pages 119-129, Palgrave Macmillan.
    3. von Hagen, Jurgen & Harden, Ian J., 1995. "Budget processes and commitment to fiscal discipline," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 771-779, April.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    dynamic inconsistency; fiscal and monetary policy interaction; independent fiscal council;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General

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