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The political economy of structural reforms under a deficit restriction

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  • Poplawski Ribeiro, Marcos
  • Beetsma, Roel

Abstract

This paper analyzes the incentives of a government facing electoral uncertainty to implement structural reforms in the presence of a deficit restriction. In designing a reform package, the government faces a trade-off between enhancing its electoral chances by providing compensation to private individuals and the cost of violating the deficit restriction. Ceteris paribus, tighter sanctions, more volatile macroeconomic shocks and lower income inequality worsen the trade-off.

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  • Poplawski Ribeiro, Marcos & Beetsma, Roel, 2008. "The political economy of structural reforms under a deficit restriction," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 179-198, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jmacro:v:30:y:2008:i:1:p:179-198
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    2. S. Deroose & E. Flores & A. Turrini, 2006. "Proceedings from the ECFIN Workshop "The budgetary implications of structural reforms" - Brussels, 2 December 2005," European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 248, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
    3. Beetsma, Roel & Schabert, Andreas & Ribeiro, Marcos Poplawski, 2008. "A Comparison of Debt and Primary-deficit Constraints," CEPR Discussion Papers 6897, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Roch, Francisco & Uhlig, Harald, 2018. "The dynamics of sovereign debt crises and bailouts," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 1-13.
    5. Pierre C. Boyer & Brian Roberson & Christoph Esslinger, 2024. "Public Debt and the Political Economy of Reforms," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 459-491, August.
    6. Sajedi, Rana, 2018. "Fiscal consequences of structural reform under constrained monetary policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 22-38.
    7. Marco Buti & Alessandro Turrini & Paul Noord & Pietro Biroli, 2009. "Defying the ‘Juncker curse’: can reformist governments be re-elected?," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 65-100, February.
    8. Marcos Poplawski-Ribeiro & Jan-Christoph Rülke, 2010. "Fiscal Expectations on the Stability and Growth Pact: Evidence from Survey Data," Working Papers 2010-05, CEPII research center.
    9. Sajedi, Rana & Steinbach, Armin, 2019. "Fiscal rules and structural reforms," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 34-42.
    10. Shangshang Li, 2024. "What Hinders Structural Reforms?," Working Papers 202404, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics.
    11. Furceri, Davide & Poplawski Ribeiro, Marcos, 2008. "Government spending volatility and the size of nations," Working Paper Series 924, European Central Bank.
    12. Bofinger, Peter & Buch, Claudia M. & Feld, Lars P. & Schmidt, Christoph M. & Wieland, Volker, 2013. "Gegen eine rückwärtsgewandte Wirtschaftspolitik. Jahresgutachten 2013/14 [Against a backward-looking economic policy. Annual Report 2013/14]," Annual Economic Reports / Jahresgutachten, German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, volume 127, number 201314.
    13. Campoy Juan Cristóbal & Negrete Juan C., 2010. "Structural Reforms and Budget Deficits in a Monetary Union: A Strategic Approach," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-31, July.

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