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The Emergence and Evolution of Social Pacts: A Provisional Framework for Comparative Analysis

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  • Avdagic, Sabina
  • Rhodes, Martin
  • Visser, Jelle

Abstract

This paper provides the scientific framework for the NEWGOV project Distributive Politics, Learning and Reform. In Part I, we establish our own definition and conceptualization of social pacts. We distinguish four types of pacts with different scope and depth: shadow pacts, headline pacts, coordinated wage setting, and embedded pacts akin to neocorporatist concertation. Part II is concerned with institutional formation, i.e. how such social pacts come into existence. We outline some standard functionalist accounts of institutional emergence, and critically examine them before proposing an alternative bargaining model. Part III is concerned with institutional development, i.e. what determines the continuation and institutionalization of social pacts or their de-institutionalization and demise. Based on the taxonomy of social pacts presented in Part I, we define two alternative evolutionary paths for social pacts (institutionalization and de-institutionalization), and identify three types of trajectory along which social pacts develop (repetition vs. abandonment; integration vs. disintegration; and expansion vs. reduction). We then outline four alternative mechanisms that may potentially drive the institutionalization or de-institutionalization of pacts. Grounded in the four major approaches for analysing institutions, i.e. the functionalist, utilitarian, normative, and power-distributional perspectives, this section proposes four groups of hypotheses to be evaluated in our empirical research.

Suggested Citation

  • Avdagic, Sabina & Rhodes, Martin & Visser, Jelle, 2005. "The Emergence and Evolution of Social Pacts: A Provisional Framework for Comparative Analysis," European Governance Papers (EUROGOV) 1, CONNEX and EUROGOV networks.
  • Handle: RePEc:erp:eurogo:p0008
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    Cited by:

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    2. Richard Hyman & Rebecca Gumbrell-McCormick, 2010. "Trade unions, politics and parties: is a new configuration possible?," Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, , vol. 16(3), pages 315-331, August.
    3. Tanya Araújo & Miguel St. Aubyn, 2008. "Education, Neighborhood Effects And Growth: An Agent-Based Model Approach," Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 11(01), pages 99-117.
    4. Sojo, Ana, 2014. "The Chilean system of contributory pensions as locus of rivalry and of a new social compact," Políticas Sociales 37293, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    5. Kahancová, Marta, 2008. "Embedding multinationals in postsocialist host countries: Social interaction and the compatibility of organizational interests with host-country institutions," MPIfG Discussion Paper 08/11, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    6. Köhler, Holm-Detlev & Calleja Jiménez, José Pablo, 2018. "Soziale Bewegungen und gewerkschaftliche Erneuerung in Spanien [Social movements and trade union revitalization in Spain]," Industrielle Beziehungen. Zeitschrift für Arbeit, Organisation und Management, Verlag Barbara Budrich, vol. 25(2), pages 147-165.
    7. Christopher Loewald & Nic Spearman Andreas Wrgtter, 2023. "Less sacrifice from collective to competitive price coordination in the South African economy," Working Papers 11049, South African Reserve Bank.
    8. Sergio CANALDA CRIADO, 2022. "Social partner participation in the management of the COVID‐19 crisis: Tripartite social dialogue in Italy, Portugal and Spain," International Labour Review, International Labour Organization, vol. 161(1), pages 149-167, March.
    9. Hyman, Richard., 2010. "Social dialogue and industrial relations during the economic crisis : innovative practices or business as usual?," ILO Working Papers 994545023402676, International Labour Organization.
    10. Sebastian Dellepiane & Niamh Hardiman, 2012. "Fiscal Politics In Time: Pathways to Fiscal Consolidation, 1980-2012," Working Papers 201228, Geary Institute, University College Dublin.
    11. Maria da Paz Campos Lima & Antonio Martín Artiles, 2011. "Crisis and trade union challenges in Portugal and Spain: between general strikes and social pacts," Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, , vol. 17(3), pages 387-402, August.
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    Keywords

    comparative public policy; political economy; sociological institutionalism; corporatism; policy learning; policy networks; organization theory; interest intermediation;
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