Gridlock and Delegation in a Changing World
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- Steven Callander & Keith Krehbiel, 2014. "Gridlock and Delegation in a Changing World," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 58(4), pages 819-834, October.
References listed on IDEAS
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"Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: Theory and experiments,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 186-230.
- Nunnari, Salvatore, 2018. "Dynamic Legislative Bargaining with Veto Power: Theory and Experiments," CEPR Discussion Papers 12938, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Salvatore Nunnari, 2019. "Dynamic Legislative Bargaining with Veto Power: Theory and Experiments," Working Papers 649, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Bowen, T. Renee & Chen, Ying & Eraslan, Hülya & Zápal, Jan, 2017.
"Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 148-176.
- Bowen, T. Renee & Chen, Ying & Eraslan, Hulya & Zapal, Jan, 2014. "Efficiency of Flexible Budgetary Institutions," Working Papers 14-031, Rice University, Department of Economics.
- T. Renee Bowen & Ying Chen & Hülya K. Eraslan & Jan Zápal, 2016. "Efficiency of Flexible Budgetary Institutions," NBER Working Papers 22457, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bowen, T. Renee & Chen, Ying & Eraslan, Hulya & Zapal, Jan, 2015. "Efficiency of Flexible Budgetary Institutions," Research Papers 3185, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Bowen, T. Renee & Chen, Ying & Eraslan, Hulya & Zapal, Jan, 2015. "Efficiency of Flexible Budgetary Institutions," Working Papers 15-003, Rice University, Department of Economics.
- Ying Chen & Jan Zapal & Hulya Eraslan & Renee Bowen, 2015. "Efficiency of Flexible Budgetary Institutions," 2015 Meeting Papers 843, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- T. Renee Bowen & Ying Chen & Hulya Eraslan & Jan Zapal, 2015. "Efficiency of Flexible Budgetary Institutions," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1516, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
- T. Renee Bowen & Ying Chen & Hulya Eraslan & Jan Zapal, 2016. "Efficiency of Flexible Budgetary Institutions," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp570, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
- Gabriele Gratton & Barton E. Lee, 2023.
"Drain the Swamp: A Theory of Anti-Elite Populism,"
Discussion Papers
2023-02, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Gabriele Gratton & Barton E. Lee, 2024. "Drain the Swamp: A Theory of Anti-Elite Populism," Discussion Papers 2023-02b, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Gleason Judd & Lawrence S. Rothenberg, 2020. "Flexibility or Stability? Analyzing Proposals to Reform the Separation of Powers," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(2), pages 309-324, April.
- Myunghoon Kang, 2017. "Representation, sophisticated voting, and the size of the gridlock region," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(4), pages 623-646, October.
- Jordan Carr Peterson, 2018. "All Their Eggs in One Basket? Ideological Congruence in Congress and the Bicameral Origins of Concentrated Delegation to the Bureaucracy," Laws, MDPI, vol. 7(2), pages 1-15, May.
- Zapal, Jan, 2020.
"Simple Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
- Jan Zapal, 2014. "Simple Markovian Equilibria in Dynamic Spatial Legislative Bargaining," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp515, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
- Dana Foarta, 2021.
"How Organizational Capacity Can Improve Electoral Accountability,"
BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers
21156, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
- Foarta, Dana, 2022. "How Organizational Capacity Can Improve Electoral Accountability," CEPR Discussion Papers 17069, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Shadmehr, Mehdi, 2015. "Simple decision rules in small groups: Collegial rule vs. rotational rule," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 51-63.
- van Gruisen, Philippe & Crombez, Christophe, 2021. "The Commission and the Council Presidency in the European Union: Strategic interactions and legislative powers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
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