Delegation and political turnover
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DOI: 10.1177/0951629819895596
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Cited by:
- Sasso, Greg & Morelli, Massimo, 2021. "Bureaucrats under Populism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
- Torun Dewan & John W Patty, 2020. "Editors’ introduction," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(2), pages 185-187, April.
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Keywords
Principal-Agent; Delegation; Bureaucracy;All these keywords.
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