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Shareholder Interests, Human Capital Investment and Corporate Governance

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  • Roberts, John

    (Stanford U)

  • Van den Steen, Eric

Abstract

Corporations simultaneously claim that human capital is increasingly important to their success and that they seek to maximize shareholder value. This paper studies the relationship between these two developments. We show that the pursuit of shareholder interests may require ceding a role in corporate governance to employees in order to motivate their investing in firm-specific human capital. Doing so becomes more attractive as these investments increase in importance. This result also bears on the debate about reforming European and Japanese governance systems in the direction of the American system, reducing employees' influence. In this context, we present a model on the optimal choice of governance systems, along ideas suggested by Holmstrom.

Suggested Citation

  • Roberts, John & Van den Steen, Eric, 2000. "Shareholder Interests, Human Capital Investment and Corporate Governance," Research Papers 1631, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:1631
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Olivier Sautel & Cécile Cézanne, 2007. "The Human Capital-Intensive Firm and Coordination: Redefined Integration and Disintegration," Working Papers hal-00628647, HAL.
    2. Matthias Benz & Bruno S. Frey, "undated". "Corporate Governance: What can we Learn from Public Governance?," IEW - Working Papers 166, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    3. Chiaki Moriguchi, 2005. "Did American Welfare Capitalists Breach Their Implicit Contracts during the Great Depression? Preliminary Findings from Company-Level Data," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 59(1), pages 51-81, October.
    4. David Kelsey & Frank Milne, 2008. "Imperfect Competition and Corporate Governance," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(6), pages 1115-1141, December.
    5. Brink, Alexander, 2011. "Spezifische Investitionen als Legitimationsgrundlage für Stakeholderansprüche," Die Unternehmung - Swiss Journal of Business Research and Practice, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 65(1), pages 50-68.
    6. Andrew M. Robinson & Hao Zhang, 2005. "Employee Share Ownership: Safeguarding Investments in Human Capital," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 43(3), pages 469-488, September.
    7. Olabode Adeleke Oyewunmi & Omotayo Adewale Osibanjo & Hezekiah Oluwabusayo Falola & Olusola Joshua Olujobi, 2017. "Optimization by Integration: A Corporate Governance and Human Resource Management Dimension," International Review of Management and Marketing, Econjournals, vol. 7(1), pages 265-272.
    8. Forcillo, Donato, 2017. "Codetermination: the Presence of Workers on the Board. A Depth Analysis," MPRA Paper 81936, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Vicente Salas-Fumas, 2010. "Governance of Knowledge-Intensive Firms in the Modern Market Economy," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(3), pages 349-372.
    10. David Kelsey & Frank Milne, 2006. "Externalities, monopoly and the objective function of the firm," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(3), pages 565-589, November.
    11. Tang, Heiwai, 2012. "Labor market institutions, firm-specific skills, and trade patterns," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 337-351.
    12. Subramanian Rangan & Metin Sengul, 2009. "Information technology and transnational integration: Theory and evidence on the evolution of the modern multinational enterprise," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 40(9), pages 1496-1514, December.
    13. repec:hal:cepnwp:hal-00628647 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Matthias Benz & Bruno S. Frey, 2006. "Towards a Constitutional Theory of Corporate Governance," IEW - Working Papers 304, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    15. Mansur Lubabah Kwambo & Ahmad Bawa Abdul-Qadir, 2013. "Dispersed Equity Holding and Financial Performance of Banks in Nigeria," International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, Human Resource Management Academic Research Society, International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, vol. 3(1), pages 238-247, January.
    16. Christine Marsal, 2006. "La cohérence dans la mobilisation du capital humain:une illustration de la théorie de l’architecture organisationnelle dans les banques de réseau," Working Papers CREGO 1060501, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    17. Valeria Naciti & Fabrizio Cesaroni & Luisa Pulejo, 2022. "Corporate governance and sustainability: a review of the existing literature," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 26(1), pages 55-74, March.
    18. Cécile Cézanne & Olivier Sautel, 2007. "Firme intensive en capital humain et coordination : vers une redéfinition du rapport entre intégration et dé-intégration," Post-Print hal-00331454, HAL.
    19. Forcillo, Donato, 2017. "Codetermination: the Necessary Presence of Workers on the Board. A Mathematical Model," MPRA Paper 81935, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Dorothee Feils & Manzur Rahman & Florin Şabac, 2018. "Corporate Governance Systems Diversity: A Coasian Perspective on Stakeholder Rights," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 150(2), pages 451-466, June.
    21. Cecile Cezanne-Sintes, 2008. "Modern corporate changes: reinstating the link between the nature, boundaries and governance of the firm," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(4), pages 447-461.

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