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Variation sur le thème 'A la recherche de nouvelles fondations pour la finance et la gouvernance d'entreprise'

Author

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  • Gérard Charreaux

    (Université de Bourgogne)

Abstract

L'objectif de cet article est de proposer une voie alternative à celle que préconise Zingales pour donner de nouvelles fondations à la finance d'entreprise. En empruntant le même cheminement que Zingales, cet article retient premièrement une définition plus large de la finance, accordant à l'investissement une place au moins équivalente à celle du financement. Deuxièmement, considérant que la vision contractuelle, dans son interprétation traditionnelle fondée sur la protection des actifs spécifiques, conduit à une théorie financière déconnectée de toute considération productive, il propose de lui substituer les théories de la firme associées aux courants cognitifs. Troisièmement, les conséquences de ce passage des théories contractuelles pour réinterpréter les décisions de financement sont analysées. Elles conduisent à apporter des explications nouvelles aux rôles des fonds propres externes et de la dette financière, mais surtout à celui de l'autofinancement, en insistant notamment sur sa dimension positive. Enfin, à l'instar de Zingales, les conséquences de ce changement de grille théorique pour la gouvernance et l'évaluation font également l'objet d'une rapide investigation.

Suggested Citation

  • Gérard Charreaux, 2001. "Variation sur le thème 'A la recherche de nouvelles fondations pour la finance et la gouvernance d'entreprise'," Working Papers CREGO 011201, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations, revised Jul 2002.
    • Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:011201
    Note: article publié dans Finance Contrôle Stratégie,voL.5,n°3,septembre 2002,p.5-68.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    finance d'entreprise; théories cognitives de la firme; investissement; fonds propres externes; autofinancement; gouvernance d'entreprise; évaluation d'entreprise; conseil d'administration.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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