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Aspetti teorici della Corporate Governance

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  • Marco Zanobio

Abstract

This paper analyzes the theoretical approach to the corporate governance, in relation to the different capitalism model. Before, in the paper, there is a survey of different principal definitions of corporate governance. Than, it investigates the different purposes of the Agency Theory, Stewardship Theory and Stakeholder Theory. It discusses the relationship between shareholders and managers and it also considers the rule of board and the item of controls. In the Annex, there’s an analysis of the principles proposed by the OECD to create a good self-regulation system of corporate governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Zanobio, 2012. "Aspetti teorici della Corporate Governance," DISEIS - Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo dis1202, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo (DISEIS).
    • Handle: RePEc:dis:wpaper:dis1202
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    corporate ggovernance; teoria dell'agenzia; stakeholder;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General

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