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Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency Are Incompatible in Production Economies

Author

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  • Leroux, Jistin

    (Rice U)

Abstract

In a production economy where a single private good is produced via a non-linear concave technology, no direct mechanism satisfies strategy-proofness and efficiency if the preference domain contains the class of linear preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Leroux, Jistin, 2004. "Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency Are Incompatible in Production Economies," Working Papers 2004-07, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecl:riceco:2004-07
    as

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    File URL: http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~econ/papers/2004papers/07leroux.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Miki Kato & Shinji Ohseto, 2002. "Toward general impossibility theorems in pure exchange economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(3), pages 659-664.
    2. Sprumont, Yves, 1995. "A note on strategyproofness in Edgeworth-Box economies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 45-50, July.
    3. François Maniquet & Yves Sprumont, 1999. "Efficient strategy-proof allocation functions in linear production economies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 14(3), pages 583-595.
    4. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2003. "Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(1), pages 73-93, August.
    5. James Schummer, 1996. "Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 14(1), pages 47-56.
    6. Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2002. "Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Rules for Pure Exchange Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 219-241, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Justin Leroux, 2011. "Sharing the Cost of Global Warming," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 113(4), pages 758-783, December.
    2. Beviá, Carmen & Corchón, Luis C., 2009. "Cooperative production and efficiency," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 143-154, March.
    3. Nishizaki, Katsuhiko, 2018. "Secure implementability under Pareto-efficient rules in linear production economies with classical preferences," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 379-383.
    4. Özgür Kıbrıs & İpek Tapkı, 2014. "A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 18(3), pages 163-189, September.
    5. Leroux, Justin, 2004. "Pooling Private Technologies: Improving upon Autarky," Working Papers 2004-08, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    6. Leroux, Justin, 2008. "Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: Characterization in the two-agent case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 558-572, March.
    7. Wataru Ishida, 2023. "Strategy-proofness in linear production economies with homothetic or quasi-linear preferences," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(1), pages 121-130, April.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis

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