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Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in many-agent economies

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  • Takeshi Momi

    (Doshisha University)

Abstract

In this paper, we show that in pure exchange economies, any Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanism is alternately dictatorial; that is, it always allocates the total endowment to a single agent even if the receivers vary. While many studies have shown that such an allocation mechanism is dictatorial in two-agent economies, it has long remained an open question whether such a characterization can be obtained in many-agent economies.

Suggested Citation

  • Takeshi Momi, 2020. "Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in many-agent economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(2), pages 325-367, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:55:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-020-01248-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-020-01248-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Miki Kato & Shinji Ohseto, 2002. "Toward general impossibility theorems in pure exchange economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(3), pages 659-664.
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    6. , Prabal & , & ,, 2014. "Strategy-proofness and Pareto-efficiency in quasi-linear exchange economies," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.
    7. Serizawa, Shigehiro & Weymark, John A., 2003. "Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 246-263, April.
    8. Takeshi Momi, 2013. "Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with Cobb–Douglas preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(3), pages 787-792, March.
    9. Momi, Takeshi, 2017. "Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(3), September.
    10. Momi, Takeshi, 2013. "Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with many agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 1237-1254.
    11. Mark A. Satterthwaite & Hugo Sonnenschein, 1981. "Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 48(4), pages 587-597.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mridu Prabal Goswami, 2022. "Non-dictatorial public distribution rules," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(2), pages 165-183, June.

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