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Secure implementability under Pareto-efficient rules in linear production economies with classical preferences

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  • Nishizaki, Katsuhiko

Abstract

This paper studies secure implementability (Saijo et al. (2007) “Secure Implementation,” Theoretical Economics 2, pp.203–229) in linear production economies with classical preferences. Although secure implementability is in general stronger than the combination of strategy-proofness and non-bossiness (Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) “Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points,” Review of Economic Studies 48, pp.587–597), this paper shows that both properties are equivalent under Pareto-efficient rules in the economies. In addition, this paper characterizes securely implementable and Pareto-efficient rules in the economies when the number of agents is two.

Suggested Citation

  • Nishizaki, Katsuhiko, 2018. "Secure implementability under Pareto-efficient rules in linear production economies with classical preferences," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 379-383.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reecon:v:72:y:2018:i:3:p:379-383
    DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2018.07.003
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    1. Bochet, Olivier & Sakai, Toyotaka, 2010. "Secure implementation in allotment economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 35-49, January.
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    20. Katsuhiko Nishizaki, 2014. "An equivalence of secure implementability and full implementability in truthful strategies in pure exchange economies with Leontief utility functions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 18(1), pages 73-82, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Secure implementation; Dominant strategy implementation; Nash implementation; Strategy-proofness; Linear production economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
    • D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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