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Incumbency Effect in Competitive Autocracies: evidence from Venezuela

Author

Listed:
  • Carlos Di Bonifacio
  • Guido Merzoni
  • Federico Trombetta

Abstract

We document the presence of a strong incumbency disadvantage in local elections in a competitive autocracy: Venezuela. Using newly coded data on municipal election outcomes, we find that municipalities having experienced a narrow victory by the pro-regime party (PSUV) are 24 percentage points less likely to re-elect a pro-regime mayor in subsequent elections compared to those with marginal opposition victories. This disadvantage is primarily influenced by voter turnout, as participation rates increase on average by 6 percentage points in municipalities where the pro-regime party narrowly won. The incumbency disadvantage is driven precisely by those elections leading to a low future abstention rate. Overall, we stress the important role of voters’ mobilization even in the context of autocratic regimes.

Suggested Citation

  • Carlos Di Bonifacio & Guido Merzoni & Federico Trombetta, 2024. "Incumbency Effect in Competitive Autocracies: evidence from Venezuela," DISEIS - Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo dis2402, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo (DISEIS).
    • Handle: RePEc:dis:wpaper:dis2402
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • D79 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Other

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