IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cge/wacage/433.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Patronage and Election Fraud: Insights from Russia’s Governors 2000–2012

Author

Listed:
  • Koenig, Christoph

    (University of Bristol)

Abstract

Theory and empirics suggest that patronage fosters election fraud. But why does fraud vary within autocracies where patronage’s incentives to manipulate should be uniformly high? In this paper, I explore whether information asymmetries can explain this phenomenon. I study the introduction of a patronage system which allowed Russia’s president to discretionarily appoint all 89 regional governors. After December 2004, all national elections were organized by governors facing removal but, crucially, only some were actually patronage-appointed with lower need to signal their qualities. I estimate the effect of the reform’s introduction and its staggered implementation on a new and verified regional fraud indicator for 7 national elections.

Suggested Citation

  • Koenig, Christoph, 2019. "Patronage and Election Fraud: Insights from Russia’s Governors 2000–2012," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 433, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cge:wacage:433
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/centres/cage/manage/publications/433-2019_koenig.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Monica Martinez‐Bravo & Priya Mukherjee & Andreas Stegmann, 2017. "The Non‐Democratic Roots of Elite Capture: Evidence From Soeharto Mayors in Indonesia," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85(6), pages 1991-2010, November.
    2. Reuter, Ora John & Szakonyi, David, 2019. "Elite Defection under Autocracy: Evidence from Russia," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 113(2), pages 552-568, May.
    3. Max Bader & Carolien van Ham, 2015. "What explains regional variation in election fraud? Evidence from Russia: a research note," Post-Soviet Affairs, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(6), pages 514-528, November.
    4. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2011. "Dictators And Their Viziers: Endogenizing The Loyalty–Competence Trade‐Off," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(5), pages 903-930, October.
    5. Beber, Bernd & Scacco, Alexandra, 2012. "What the Numbers Say: A Digit-Based Test for Election Fraud," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(2), pages 211-234, April.
    6. Oka, Natsuko, 2009. "Ethnicity and Elections under Authoritarianism: The Case of Kazakhstan," IDE Discussion Papers 194, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO).
    7. Stephen White & Valentina Feklyunina, 2011. "Russia's Authoritarian Elections: The View from Below," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 63(4), pages 579-602.
    8. Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, 2010. "Subnational Governance in Russia: How Putin Changed the Contract with His Agents and the Problems It Created for Medvedev," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 40(4), pages 672-696, Fall.
    9. Rodion Skovoroda & Tomila Lankina, 2017. "Fabricating votes for Putin: new tests of fraud and electoral manipulations from Russia," Post-Soviet Affairs, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(2), pages 100-123, March.
    10. repec:cup:apsrev:v:113:y:2019:i:03:p:710-726_00 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Rozenas, Arturas, 2017. "Detecting Election Fraud from Irregularities in Vote-Share Distributions," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(1), pages 41-56, January.
    12. Michael Rochlitz, 2016. "Political Loyalty Vs Economic Performance: Evidence from Machine Politics in Russia’S Regions," HSE Working papers WP BRP 34/PS/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    13. Robert G. Moser & Allison C. White, 2017. "Does electoral fraud spread? The expansion of electoral manipulation in Russia," Post-Soviet Affairs, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(2), pages 85-99, March.
    14. Callen, Michael & Long, James D., 2015. "Institutional corruption and election fraud: evidence from a field experiment in Afghanistan," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 102931, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    15. Simpser,Alberto, 2013. "Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107030541, September.
    16. Michael Callen & James D. Long, 2015. "Institutional Corruption and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(1), pages 354-381, January.
    17. Ora Reuter, 2010. "The Politics of Dominant Party Formation: United Russia and Russia's Governors," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 62(2), pages 293-327.
    18. Helge Blakkisrud, 2011. "Medvedev's New Governors," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 63(3), pages 367-395.
    19. Evgeniya Lukinova & Mikhail Myagkov & Peter Ordeshook, 2011. "Metastasised Fraud in Russia's 2008 Presidential Election," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 63(4), pages 603-621.
    20. J. Goode, 2007. "The puzzle of Putin's gubernatorial appointments," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 59(3), pages 365-399.
    21. Ziblatt, Daniel, 2009. "Shaping Democratic Practice and the Causes of Electoral Fraud: The Case of Nineteenth-Century Germany," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 103(1), pages 1-21, February.
    22. Monica Martinez-Bravo, 2014. "The Role of Local Officials in New Democracies: Evidence from Indonesia," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(4), pages 1244-1287, April.
    23. Vladimir Gel'man, 2008. "Party Politics in Russia: From Competition to Hierarchy," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 60(6), pages 913-930.
    24. Rundlett, Ashlea & Svolik, Milan W., 2016. "Deliver the Vote! Micromotives and Macrobehavior in Electoral Fraud," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 110(1), pages 180-197, February.
    25. Little, Andrew T., 2015. "Fraud and Monitoring in Non-competitive Elections," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(1), pages 21-41, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Christoph Koenig, 2024. "With a Little Help From the Crowd: Estimating Election Fraud with Forensic Methods," CEIS Research Paper 584, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 28 Oct 2024.
    2. Koenig, Christoph, 2015. "Competence vs. Loyalty: Political survival and electoral fraud in Russia’s regions 2000–2012," Economic Research Papers 270014, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    3. Ananyev, Maxim & Poyker, Michael, 2022. "Do dictators signal strength with electoral fraud?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    4. Oleg Sidorkin & Dmitriy Vorobyev, 2020. "Extra votes to signal loyalty: regional political cycles and national elections in Russia," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 185(1), pages 183-213, October.
    5. Casas, Agustín & Díaz, Guillermo & Trindade, André, 2017. "Who monitors the monitor? Effect of party observers on electoral outcomes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 136-149.
    6. Grigorii V Golosov, 2018. "Russia’s centralized authoritarianism in the disguise of democratic federalism: Evidence from the September 2017 sub-national elections," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 21(3), pages 231-248, September.
    7. Michael Rochlitz & Evgeniya Mitrokhina & Irina Nizovkina, 2020. "Bureaucratic Discrimination in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes: Experimental Evidence from Russia," Bremen Papers on Economics & Innovation 2010, University of Bremen, Faculty of Business Studies and Economics.
    8. Michael Rochlitz, 2016. "Political Loyalty Vs Economic Performance: Evidence from Machine Politics in Russia’S Regions," HSE Working papers WP BRP 34/PS/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    9. Guriev, Sergei & Treisman, Daniel, 2020. "A theory of informational autocracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    10. Kravtsova, Maria & Libman, Alexander, 2023. "Historical family structure as a predictor of liberal voting: Evidence from a century of Russian history," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 47(2).
    11. Benjamin Crost & Joseph H Felter & Hani Mansour & Daniel I Rees, 0. "Narrow Incumbent Victories and Post-Election Conflict: Evidence from the Philippines," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 34(3), pages 767-789.
    12. Andrew T Little, 2017. "Are non-competitive elections good for citizens?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(2), pages 214-242, April.
    13. Hao Hong & Tsz-Ning Wong, 2020. "Authoritarian election as an incentive scheme," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(3), pages 460-493, July.
    14. David Szakonyi, 2020. "Candidate Filtering: The Strategic Use of Electoral Fraud in Russia," Working Papers 2020-23, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
    15. Paul Pelzl & Steven Poelhekke, 2023. "Democratization, leader education and growth: firm-level evidence from Indonesia," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 571-600, December.
    16. André Schultz & Alexander Libman, 2015. "Is there a local knowledge advantage in federations? Evidence from a natural experiment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(1), pages 25-42, January.
    17. Sonin, Konstantin & Egorov, Georgy, 2014. "Incumbency Advantage in Non-Democracies," CEPR Discussion Papers 10178, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Adlai Newson & Francesco Trebbi, 2018. "Authoritarian elites," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 51(4), pages 1088-1117, November.
    19. Anirban Mitra & Sarmistha Pal, 2020. "Democratisation under Diversity: Theory and Evidence from Indonesian Communities," Studies in Economics 2003, School of Economics, University of Kent.
    20. Nikolaos Artavanis & Adair Morse & Margarita Tsoutsoura, 2015. "Tax Evasion across Industries: Soft Credit Evidence from Greece," NBER Working Papers 21552, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    JEL Classification:;

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cge:wacage:433. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Jane Snape (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dewaruk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.