Strategic aspects of vertical delegation
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- Caillaud, Bernard & Rey, Patrick, 1994. "Strategic aspects of vertical delegation," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9422, CEPREMAP.
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Citations
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"Exclusive dealing and vertical integration in interlocking relationships,"
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- Nocke, Volker & Rey, Patrick, 2014. "Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration in Interlocking Relationships," TSE Working Papers 14-515, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jun 2018.
- Nocke, Volker & Rey, Patrick, 2014. "Exclusive dealing and vertical integration in interlocking relationships," Working Papers 14-22, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
- Rey, Patrick & Nocke, Volker, 2014. "Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration in Interlocking Relationships," CEPR Discussion Papers 10176, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Volker Nocke & Patrick Rey, 2018. "Exclusive dealing and vertical integration in interlocking relationships," Post-Print hal-02621675, HAL.
- Nocke, Volker & Rey, Patrick, 2014. "Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration in Interlocking Relationships," IDEI Working Papers 833, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Sep 2014.
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- Stéphane Caprice & Vanessa von Schlippenbach & Christian Wey, 2014. "Supplier Fixed Costs and Retail Market Monopolization," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1408, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
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- Anil Arya & Brian Mittendorf & Dae-Hee Yoon, 2008. "Friction in Related-Party Trade When a Rival Is Also a Customer," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(11), pages 1850-1860, November.
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"The strategic value of partial vertical integration,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 284-302.
- Fiocco, Raffaele, 2014. "The strategic value of partial vertical integration," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 455, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Fiocco, Raffaele, 2016. "The strategic value of partial vertical integration," Working Papers 2072/267267, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
- Jansen, Jos, 2003. "Coexistence of strategic vertical separation and integration," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 699-716, May.
- Inés Macho‐Stadler & Noriaki Matsushima & Ryusuke Shinohara, 2021.
"Organizational Structure and Technological Investment,"
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- Noriaki Matsushima & Ryusuke Shinohara & Inés Macho-Stadler, 2021. "Organizational Structure and Technological Investment," Working Papers 1243, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Inés Macho-Stadler & Noriaki Matsushima & Ryusuke Shinohara, 2019. "Organizational structure and technological investment," ISER Discussion Paper 1069r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, revised Apr 2020.
- Inés Macho-Stadler & Noriaki Matsushima & Ryusuke Shinohara, 2019. "Organizational Structure and Technological Investment," ISER Discussion Paper 1069, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
- Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2007.
"A Primer on Foreclosure,"
Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 33, pages 2145-2220,
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- Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2003. "A Primer on Foreclosure," IDEI Working Papers 203, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Nov 2005.
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"Manufacturer collusion: Strategic implications of the channel structure,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(4), pages 923-954, December.
- Reisinger, Markus & Thomes, Tim Paul, 2017. "Manufacturer collusion: Strategic implications of the channel structure," DICE Discussion Papers 261, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Antoine Faure‐Grimaud, 1997. "The Regulation of Predatory Firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 425-451, June.
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- Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2014.
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Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(1), pages 1-24, January.
- Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2011. "Organizational structure, strategic delegation and innovation in oligopolistic industries," Working Papers 2011/09, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
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"Vertical Separation with Private Contracts,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 122(559), pages 173-207, March.
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- Alain Bayet & Fabienne Rosenwald, 1997. "Relations verticales, intégration et barrières à l'entrée," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 48, pages 227-251.
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- Caprice, Stéphane & von Schlippenbach, Vanessa, 2013. "One-stop shopping as a cause of slotting fees: A rent-shifting mechanism," DICE Discussion Papers 97, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
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