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Rawlsian Matching

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  • Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz
  • Dur, Umut

Abstract

We apply the Rawlsian principle to a canonical discrete object allocation problem. A matching is Rawlsian if it is impossible to improve the ranking of assignment for the worst-off agent or reduce the cardinality of the set of the worst-off agent-body. None of the well-known mechanisms are Rawlsian. We introduce an efficient and Rawlsian class of mechanisms. Strategy-proofness is incompatible with Rawlsianism; therefore, no Rawlsian mechanism is strategy-proof.

Suggested Citation

  • Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Dur, Umut, 2024. "Rawlsian Matching," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 101-106.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:129:y:2024:i:c:p:101-106
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.04.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Yeon-Koo Che & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Olivier Tercieux, 2020. "Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 425-442, December.
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    6. Mustafa Oguz Afacan & Umut Dur & A. Arda Gitmez & Ozgur Y{i}lmaz, 2022. "Improving the Deferred Acceptance with Minimal Compromise," Papers 2205.00032, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.
    7. Fuhito Kojima & Parag A. Pathak, 2009. "Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 608-627, June.
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