Report NEP-DES-2021-01-25

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Caspari, Gian, 2020. "Booster draft mechanism for multi-object assignment," ZEW Discussion Papers 20-074, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
• Kuvalekar, Aditya Vijay, 2021. "A fair procedure in a marriage market," UC3M Working papers. Economics 31711, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
• Roy, Souvik & Sadhukhan, Soumyarup, 2020. "On the equivalence of strategy-proofness and upper contour strategy-proofness for randomized social choice functions," MPRA Paper 104405, University Library of Munich, Germany.
• Jacob Schwartz & Kyungchul Song, 2021. "The Law of Large Numbers for Large Stable Matchings," Papers 2101.00399, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
• Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Joshua D. Angrist & Yusuke Narita & Parag A. Pathak, 2019. "Breaking Ties: Regression Discontinuity Design Meets Market Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2170R Publication Status:, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Dec 2020.
• Seifert, Stefan & Hüttel, Silke, 2020. "Common values and unobserved heterogeneity in farmland auctions in Germany," FORLand Working Papers 21 (2020), Humboldt University Berlin, DFG Research Unit 2569 FORLand "Agricultural Land Markets – Efficiency and Regulation".
• D'avid Csercsik, 2020. "Strategic bidding via the interplay of minimum income condition orders in day-ahead power exchanges," Papers 2012.07789, arXiv.org.
• Fugger, Nicolas & Laitenberger, Ulrich, 2020. "Split-award auctions and supply disruptions," ZEW Discussion Papers 20-082, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
• Roy, Souvik & Sadhukhan, Soumyarup, 2020. "On the structure of division rules," MPRA Paper 104402, University Library of Munich, Germany.
• Louis Golowich & Shengwu Li, 2021. "On the Computational Properties of Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms," Papers 2101.05149, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
• Kerman, Toygar & Tenev, Anastas P., 2021. "Persuading communicating voters," Research Memorandum 003, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
• Sarah Auster & Nicola Pavoni, 2021. "Optimal Delegation and Information Transmission Under Limited Awareness," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2020_256, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
• Mathevet, Laurent & Taneva, Ina, 2020. "Organized Information Transmission," MPRA Paper 104302, University Library of Munich, Germany.
• Soham R. Phade & Venkat Anantharam, 2021. "Mechanism Design for Cumulative Prospect Theoretic Agents: A General Framework and the Revelation Principle," Papers 2101.08722, arXiv.org.