IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/crb/wpaper/2024-13.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Sharing the cost of cleaning up non-point source pollution

Author

Listed:
  • Sylvain Béal

    (Université de Franche-Comté, CRESE, UR3190, F-25000 Besançon, France)

  • David Lowing

    (Laboratoire de Génie Industriel, CentraleSupélec, Université Paris-Saclay, France)

  • Léa Munich

    (Université de Franche-Comté, CRESE, UR3190, F-25000 Besançon, France and Université de Lorraine, BETA, F-54000 Nancy, France)

Abstract

We consider the problem of sharing the cost of cleaning the non-point source pollution of industrial sites among the firms that own these sites. The bilateral liabilities between firms are depicted by an undirected graph. We introduce and characterize axiomatically two allocation rules inspired by the celebrated Polluter pays and Beneficiary pays principles in environmental law. The first one shares evenly the cost of cleaning up a site among the firms that can have caused the corresponding environmental damage. The second one charges to each firm the entire cost of cleaning up its own production site. We also establish connections with cooperative game theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Sylvain Béal & David Lowing & Léa Munich, 2024. "Sharing the cost of cleaning up non-point source pollution," Working Papers 2024-13, CRESE.
    • Handle: RePEc:crb:wpaper:2024-13
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://crese.univ-fcomte.fr/uploads/wp/WP-2024-13.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2024
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Graphs and Cooperation in Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 2(3), pages 225-229, August.
    2. Segerson, Kathleen, 1988. "Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 87-98, March.
    3. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Gómez-Rúa, María & Molis, Elena, 2015. "Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the Upstream Responsibility rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 134-150.
    4. Hou, Dongshuang & Sun, Panfei & Yang, Guangjing, 2020. "Sharing the costs of cleanup polluted river: Upstream compensation method," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
    5. William Thomson, 2011. "Consistency and its converse: an introduction," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(4), pages 257-291, December.
    6. Samuel Ferey & Pierre Dehez, 2016. "Multiple Causation, Apportionment, and the Shapley Value," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(1), pages 143-171.
    7. Wenzhong Li & Genjiu Xu & René van den Brink, 2023. "Two new classes of methods to share the cost of cleaning up a polluted river," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(1), pages 35-59, July.
    8. Dehez, Pierre & Ferey, Samuel, 2013. "How to share joint liability: A cooperative game approach," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 44-50.
    9. Moulin, Herve & Laigret, Francois, 2011. "Equal-need sharing of a network under connectivity constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 314-320, May.
    10. Panfei Sun & Dongshuang Hou & Hao Sun, 2019. "Responsibility and sharing the cost of cleaning a polluted river," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 89(1), pages 143-156, February.
    11. Crettez Bertrand & Deloche Régis, 2019. "A Law-and-Economics Perspective on Cost-Sharing Rules for a Condo Elevator," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 1-20, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jens Gudmundsson & Jens Leth Hougaard & Chiu Yu Ko, 2020. "Sharing sequentially triggered losses," IFRO Working Paper 2020/05, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
    2. Takayuki Oishi & Gerard van der Laan & René van den Brink, 2018. "The Tort Law and the Nucleolus for Generalized Joint Liability Problems," Discussion Papers 37, Meisei University, School of Economics.
    3. Hao Wu & Rene van den Brink & Arantza Estevez-Fernandez, 2022. "Highway toll allocation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 22-036/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    4. Kim, Jeong-Yoo & Lee, Seewoo, 2019. "Apportionment of liability by the stochastic Shapley value," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    5. Pierre Dehez, 2017. "On Harsanyi Dividends and Asymmetric Values," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 19(03), pages 1-36, September.
    6. Wu, Hao & van den Brink, René & Estévez-Fernández, Arantza, 2024. "Highway toll allocation," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 180(C).
    7. Dongshuang Hou & Qianqian Kong & Xia Zhang & Hao Sun, 2021. "Adjacent Downstream Compensation Method of Sharing Polluted Rivers," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 251-265, February.
    8. Jorge Alcalde-Unzu & María Gómez-Rúa & Elena Molis, 2021. "Allocating the costs of cleaning a river: expected responsibility versus median responsibility," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(1), pages 185-214, March.
    9. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Moulin, Hervé, 2014. "Sharing the cost of redundant items," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 339-352.
    10. Kevin Techer, 2023. "Hazardous waste transportation: a cost allocation analysis," Working Papers hal-04099139, HAL.
    11. Wenzhong Li & Genjiu Xu & Rene van den Brink, 2021. "Sharing the cost of cleaning up a polluted river," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 21-028/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    12. Hao Wu & Rene van den Brink & Arantza Estevez-Fernandez, 2022. "The locally partial permission value for games with a permission structure," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 22-037/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    13. Béal, Sylvain & Ferrières, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2016. "Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 47-57.
    14. Demuynck, Thomas & Rock, Bram De & Ginsburgh, Victor, 2016. "The transfer paradox in welfare space," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 1-4.
    15. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Gallo, Oihane & Inarra, Elena & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D., 2024. "Solidarity to achieve stability," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 315(1), pages 368-377.
    16. Acosta-Vega, Rick K. & Algaba, Encarnación & Sánchez-Soriano, Joaquín, 2023. "Design of water quality policies based on proportionality in multi-issue problems with crossed claims," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 311(2), pages 777-788.
    17. René Brink, 2017. "Games with a permission structure - A survey on generalizations and applications," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 25(1), pages 1-33, April.
    18. Dongshuang Hou & Aymeric Lardon & Panfei Sun & Genjiu Xu, 2019. "Sharing a Polluted River under Waste Flow Control," GREDEG Working Papers 2019-23, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    19. Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2012. "The sequential equal surplus division for sharing a river," MPRA Paper 37346, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Sylvain Béal & Adriana Navarro-Ramos & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2023. "Sharing the cost of hazardous transportation networks and the Priority Shapley value," Working Papers 2023-03, CRESE.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperative game theory; Cost allocation; Pollution; liability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:crb:wpaper:2024-13. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Lauent Kondratuk (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/crufcfr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.