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Adjacent Downstream Compensation Method of Sharing Polluted Rivers

Author

Listed:
  • Dongshuang Hou

    (Northwestern Polytechnical University)

  • Qianqian Kong

    (Northwestern Polytechnical University)

  • Xia Zhang

    (Northwestern Polytechnical University)

  • Hao Sun

    (Northwestern Polytechnical University)

Abstract

To clean up the pollutants in cross-boundary rivers needs the collaborative actions among different agents involved. In our paper, we deal with the river pollution problem in a cooperative situation. We first introduce the adjacent downstream compensation method by considering the bargaining behavior between any two neighbour agents, which reconciles two famous doctrines in the international disputes, i.e., the Absolute Territorial Sovereignty theory and the Unlimited Territorial Integrity theory. Then we prove the coincidence of the adjacent downstream compensation method and the Shapley value of the corresponding responsibility game. By studying the concavity of the river pollution cost sharing game, we illustrate the stability of the adjacent downstream compensation method.

Suggested Citation

  • Dongshuang Hou & Qianqian Kong & Xia Zhang & Hao Sun, 2021. "Adjacent Downstream Compensation Method of Sharing Polluted Rivers," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 251-265, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:30:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s10726-020-09715-w
    DOI: 10.1007/s10726-020-09715-w
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    References listed on IDEAS

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