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Highway toll allocation

Author

Listed:
  • Hao Wu

    (Hunan University)

  • Rene van den Brink

    (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

  • Arantza Estevez-Fernandez

    (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the allocation of the total toll collected in a highway among its segments. Based on different toll charging rules, we propose the Segments Equal Sharing method, the Exits Equal Sharing method, and the Entrances Equal Sharing method. We provide axioms and characterize these methods used to distribute the toll. Besides, we show how these methods can be obtained by applying the Shapley value to associated coalitional transferable utility games.

Suggested Citation

  • Hao Wu & Rene van den Brink & Arantza Estevez-Fernandez, 2022. "Highway toll allocation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 22-036/II, Tinbergen Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20220036
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Highway toll allocation problem; Axiomatic characterization; Shapley value;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • R49 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Other
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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