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Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth

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  • Anderlini, Luca
  • Felli, Leonardo
  • Immordino, Giovanni
  • Riboni, Alessandro

Abstract

We analyze the relationship between legal institutions, innovation and growth. We compare a rigid (law set ex-ante) legal system and a flexible one (law set after observing current technology). The flexible system dominates in terms of welfare, amount of innovation and output growth at intermediate stages of technological development ? periods when legal change is needed. The rigid system is preferable at early stages of technological development, when (lack of) commitment problems are severe. For mature technologies the two legal systems are equivalent. We find that rigid legal systems may induce excessive (greater than first-best) R&D investment and output growth.

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  • Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Immordino, Giovanni & Riboni, Alessandro, 2011. "Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 8433, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8433
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    Cited by:

    1. Immordino, Giovanni & Polo, Michele, 2014. "Antitrust, legal standards and investment," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 36-50.
    2. Dung Phuong Hoang & Lan Khanh Chu, 2023. "Progression to Higher Economic Complexity: The Role of Institutions," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 14(4), pages 4339-4366, December.
    3. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Giovanni Immordino & Alessandro Riboni, 2013. "Legal Institutions, Innovation, And Growth," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 54(3), pages 937-956, August.
    4. Furukawa, Yuichi & Lai, Tat-kei & Sato, Kenji, 2019. "Love of Novelty: A Source of Innovation-Based Growth... or Underdevelopment Traps?," MPRA Paper 92915, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Giovanni Immordino & Michele Polo, 2012. "Antitrust in Innovative Industries: the Optimal Legal Standards," Working Papers 434, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    6. Viktor Koval & Oksana Borodina & Iryna Lomachynska & Piotr Olczak & Anzor Mumladze & Dominika Matuszewska, 2022. "Model Analysis of Eco-Innovation for National Decarbonisation Transition in Integrated European Energy System," Energies, MDPI, vol. 15(9), pages 1-19, May.
    7. Leontitsis, Alexandros & Philippas, Dionisis & Sickles, Robin C. & Tziogkidis, Panagiotis, 2018. "Evaluating countries’ innovation potential: an international perspective," Working Papers 18-011, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    8. Massenot Baptiste, 2010. "Contract Enforcement, Litigation, and Economic Development," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 10.14, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    9. Cristian Barra & Nazzareno Ruggiero, 2023. "Quality of Government and Types of Innovation—Empirical Evidence for Italian Manufacturing Firms," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 14(2), pages 1749-1789, June.
    10. Massenot, Baptiste, 2011. "Financial development in adversarial and inquisitorial legal systems," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 602-608.
    11. Furukawa, Yuichi & Lai, Tat-kei & Sato, Kenji, 2017. "Receptivity and Innovation," MPRA Paper 81536, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. De Chiara, Alessandro & Manna, Ester, 2022. "Corruption, regulation, and investment incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    13. FURUKAWA Yuichi & NIWA Sumiko, 2021. "Deflation and Declining Business Dynamism in a Cash-in-Advance Economy," Discussion papers 21058, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Commitment; Flexibility; Growth; Innovation; Legal system;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • O3 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth

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