Contract enforcement, litigation, and economic development
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- Massenot Baptiste, 2010. "Contract Enforcement, Litigation, and Economic Development," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 10.14, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
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Cited by:
- Lin, Hui Ling & Pukthuanthong, Kuntara & Walker, Thomas John, 2013. "An international look at the lawsuit avoidance hypothesis of IPO underpricing," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(C), pages 56-77.
- Massenot, Baptiste, 2011.
"Financial development in adversarial and inquisitorial legal systems,"
Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 602-608.
- Massenot, Baptiste, 2010. "Financial development in adversarial and inquisitorial legal systems," MPRA Paper 27098, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Massenot Baptiste, 2010. "Financial Development in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Legal Systems," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 10.13, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
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More about this item
Keywords
contract enforcement; litigation; lawyers; economic development;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
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