Incentives to Innovate and Social Harm: Laissez-Faire, Authorization or Penalties?
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- Immordino, Giovanni & Pagano, Marco & Polo, Michele, 2011. "Incentives to innovate and social harm: Laissez-faire, authorization or penalties?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 864-876.
- Immordino, Giovanni & Pagano, Marco & Polo, Michele, 2011. "Incentives to innovate and social harm: Laissez-faire, authorization or penalties?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7-8), pages 864-876, August.
- Giovanni Immordino & Marco Pagano & Michele Polo, 2009. "Incentives to Innovate and Social Harm:Laissez-Faire, Authorization or Penalties?," Working Papers 349, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Pagano, Marco & Polo, Michele & Immordino, Giovanni, 2009. "Incentives to Innovate and Social Harm: Laissez-Faire, Authorization or Penalties?," CEPR Discussion Papers 7280, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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- Joshua Schwartzstein & Andrei Shleifer, 2013.
"An Activity-Generating Theory of Regulation,"
Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(1), pages 1-38.
- Joshua Schwartzstein & Andrei Shleifer, "undated". "An Activity-Generating Theory of Regulation," Working Paper 19524, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Joshua Schwartzstein & Andrei Shleifer, 2009. "An Activity-Generating Theory of Regulation," NBER Working Papers 14752, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Schwartzstein, Joshua & Shleifer, Andrei, 2013. "An Activity-Generating Theory of Regulation," Scholarly Articles 27814564, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Immordino, Giovanni & Polo, Michele, 2014.
"Antitrust, legal standards and investment,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 36-50.
- Giovanni Immordino & Michele Polo, 2013. "Antitrust, Legal Standards and Investment," IEFE Working Papers 54, IEFE, Center for Research on Energy and Environmental Economics and Policy, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
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- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Giovanni Immordino & Alessandro Riboni, 2010. "Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth," CSEF Working Papers 256, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
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- Giovanni Immordino & Michele Polo, 2012. "Antitrust in Innovative Industries: the Optimal Legal Standards," Working Papers 434, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
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- Giovanni Immordino & Michele Polo, 2013. "Public Policies in Investment Intensive Industries," Working Papers 507, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Giovanni Immordino & Michele Polo, 2013. "Public Policies in Investment Intensive Industries," IEFE Working Papers 59, IEFE, Center for Research on Energy and Environmental Economics and Policy, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
- Cristian Barra & Nazzareno Ruggiero, 2023. "Quality of Government and Types of Innovation—Empirical Evidence for Italian Manufacturing Firms," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 14(2), pages 1749-1789, June.
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More about this item
Keywords
innovation; liability for harm; safety regulation; authorization;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2009-04-05 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-INO-2009-04-05 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2009-04-05 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-MIC-2009-04-05 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2009-04-05 (Regulation)
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