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Reform Redux: Measurement, Determinants and Reversals

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  • Campos, Nauro
  • Horváth, Roman

Abstract

We construct objective measures of privatization, internal and external liberalization reform efforts, across countries over time, and investigate their determinants, reversals and macroeconomic impacts. We find that GDP growth determines external liberalization and privatization, concentration of political power drives internal liberalization, and democracy underpins all three. We find that FDI inflows reduce the probability of privatization reversals, labour strikes increase that of internal liberalization reversals, and OECD growth increase that of external liberalization reversals. We replicate previous studies and find that the macroeconomic effects of reform (when measured objectively) tend to be larger and more precisely estimated.

Suggested Citation

  • Campos, Nauro & Horváth, Roman, 2006. "Reform Redux: Measurement, Determinants and Reversals," CEPR Discussion Papers 5673, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5673
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    Cited by:

    1. Fidrmuc, Jan & Karaja, Elira, 2013. "Uncertainty, informational spillovers and policy reform: A gravity model approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 182-192.
    2. Paul van den Noord & Björn Döhring & Sven Langedijk & João Nogueira Martins & Lucio Pench & Heliodoro Temprano-Arroyo & Michael Thiel, 2008. "The Evolution of Economic Governance in EMU," European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 328, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
    3. Ian Babetskii & Nauro Campos, 2006. "Does Reform Work? An Econometric Examination of the Reform-Growth Puzzle," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp870, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    4. Jain, Sanjay & Majumdar, Sumon & Mukand, Sharun W, 2014. "Walk the line: Conflict, state capacity and the political dynamics of reform," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 150-166.
    5. Dean Jolliffe, 2007. "Earnings, Schooling, and Economic Reform: Econometric Evidence From Hungary (1986--2004)," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 21(3), pages 509-526, July.
    6. Nauro Campos & Fabrizio Coricelli, 2010. "Financial Liberalization, Elite Heterogeneity and Political Reform," PSE - G-MOND WORKING PAPERS halshs-00967428, HAL.
    7. Horvath, Roman & Petrovski, Dragan, 2013. "International stock market integration: Central and South Eastern Europe compared," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 81-91.
    8. Tarabar, Danko, 2017. "Culture, democracy, and market reforms: Evidence from transition countries," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 456-480.
    9. Campos, Nauro F. & Coricelli, Fabrizio, 2009. "Financial Liberalization and Democracy: The Role of Reform Reversals," IZA Discussion Papers 4338, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    10. Selen Guerin & Stefano Manzocchi, 2009. "Political regime and FDI from advanced to emerging countries," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 145(1), pages 75-91, April.
    11. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-00967428 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Christopher Gerry & Tomasz Mickiewicz, 2008. "Inequality, democracy and taxation: Lessons from the post-communist transition," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 60(1), pages 89-111.
    13. Campos, Nauro F. & Horváth, Roman, 2012. "On the reversibility of structural reforms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 217-219.
    14. Campos, Nauro F. & Horváth, Roman, 2012. "Reform redux: Measurement, determinants and growth implications," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 227-237.
    15. Nauro F. Campos & Paul De Grauwe & Yuemei Ji, 2017. "Structural Reforms, Growth and Inequality: An Overview of Theory, Measurement and Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 6812, CESifo.
    16. Jan Fidrmuc & Elira Karaja & Ariane Tichit, 2012. "Reform, Uncertainty and Spillovers - A Gravity Model Approach," CESifo Working Paper Series 3745, CESifo.
    17. Tom Coupe, 2010. "Female Ministers, Governance and Reforms," Discussion Papers 34, Kyiv School of Economics.
    18. Artur Radziwill & Pawel Smietanka, 2009. "EU's Eastern Neighbours: Institutional Harmonisation and Potential Growth Bonus," CASE Network Studies and Analyses 0386, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political economy; Transition; Reform; Privatization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • E23 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Production
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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