IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fth/teavfo/27-91.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Benefits of Crisis for Economic Reforms

Author

Listed:
  • Drazen, A.
  • Grilli, V.

Abstract

This paper presents a model in which economic crises have positive effects on welfare. Periods of very high inflation create the incentive for the resolution of social conflict and thus facilitate the introduction of economic reforms and the achievement of higher levels of welfare. Policies to reduce the cost of inflation, such as indexation, raise inflation and delay the adoption of reforms, but have no effect on expected social welfare.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Drazen, A. & Grilli, V., 1991. "The Benefits of Crisis for Economic Reforms," Papers 27-91, Tel Aviv.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:teavfo:27-91
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    2. Alesina, Alberto & Drazen, Allan, 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1170-1188, December.
    3. Stanley Fischer & Lawrence H. Summers, 1989. "Should Nations Learn to Live With Inflation?," NBER Working Papers 2815, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Fischer, Stanley & Summers, Lawrence H, 1989. "Should Governments Learn to Live with Inflation?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(2), pages 382-387, May.
    5. Laurence Ball & Stephen G. Cecchetti, 1989. "Wage Indexation and Time-Consistent Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 2948, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Leitzel, Jim, 1998. "Goods Diversion and Repressed Inflation: Notes on the Political Economy of Price Liberalization," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3-4), pages 255-266, March.
    2. Mr. Athanasios Vamvakidis, 2007. "External Debt and Economic Reform: Does a Pain Reliever Delay the Necessary Treatment?," IMF Working Papers 2007/050, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Jim Leitzel, 1998. "Goods diversion and repressed inflation: Notes on the political economy of price liberalization," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 255-266, March.
    4. Ed Westerhout & Ona Ciocyte, 2017. "The role of inflation-linked bonds," CPB Discussion Paper 344, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    5. Nora Abu Asab & Juan Carlos Cuestas & Alberto Montagnoli, 2018. "Inflation targeting or exchange rate targeting: Which framework supports the goal of price stability in emerging market economies?," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 13(8), pages 1-21, August.
    6. Harashima, Taiji, 2007. "Hyperinflation, disinflation, deflation, etc.: A unified and micro-founded explanation for inflation," MPRA Paper 3836, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Carlos Scartascini & Mariano Tommasi & Ernesto Stein, 2010. "Veto Players and Policy Trade-Offs- An Intertemporal Approach to Study the Effects of Political Institutions on Policy," Research Department Publications 4660, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    8. Mondino, Guillermo & Sturzenegger, Federico & Tommasi, Mariano, 1996. "Recurrent High Inflation and Stabilization: A Dynamic Game," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(4), pages 981-996, November.
    9. Elbahnasawy, Nasr G. & Ellis, Michael A., 2022. "Inflation and the Structure of Economic and Political Systems," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 59-74.
    10. Ball, Laurence, 1995. "Time-consistent policy and persistent changes in inflation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 329-350, November.
    11. John Y. Campbell & Robert J. Shiller, 1996. "A Scorecard for Indexed Government Debt," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1996, Volume 11, pages 155-208, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Mr. Esteban Jadresic, 1998. "The Macroeconomic Consequences of Wage Indexation Revisited," IMF Working Papers 1998/015, International Monetary Fund.
    13. Joseph G. Haubrich & Joseph A. Ritter, 1992. "Commitment as irreversible investment," Working Papers (Old Series) 9217, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    14. Steven Holland, 1994. "Inflation and Wage Indexation in the Postwar U.S," Macroeconomics 9402001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Gian Maria Milesi‐Ferretti, 1995. "Do Good Or Do Well? Public Debt Management In A Two‐Party Economy," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 59-78, March.
    16. Esteban Jadresic, 1998. "The Macroeconomic Consequences of Wage Indexation Revisited," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 35, Central Bank of Chile.
    17. Joseph G. Haubrich & Joseph A. Ritter, 1996. "Dynamic commitment and imperfect policy rules," Working Papers (Old Series) 9601, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    18. Ernesto Dal Bo, 2002. "Supermajority Voting Rules: Balancing Commitment and Flexibility," Economics Series Working Papers 132, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    19. Javier Gómez, "undated". "Wage Indexation, Inflation Inertia, and the Cost of Disinflation - New version," Borradores de Economia 198nv, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:teavfo:27-91. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thomas Krichel (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/fotauil.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.