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Habit Formation with Recursive Preferences

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  • Aylin Seckin

Abstract

In the literature of financial economics, there has not been introduced yet a model which is capable of explaining at the same time high risk premium and low risk-free rate. Mehra and Prescott (1985) have found that it requires implausibly high levels of risk aversion on the part of the representative agent in order to reconcile these two puzzles. On the other hand, if the extremely risk averse agent hypothesis is taken to be true, then the classical consumption theory cannot explain empirically the risk-free interest rate puzzle unless a negative time preference rate is assumed. In this paper, we introduce habit formation into the consumption portfolio choice problem of infinitely lived representative agent with the Epstein-Zin preferences. We propose a better performing model than the one with the conventional additive and homogenous von Neuman Morgenstern intertemporal utility function in dealing with these two puzzles. It is well known that the specification of recursive preferences has the advantage of partially disentangling the intertemporal substitution and the risk aversion. On the other hand, a utility function with habit forming preferences implies temporal non-separability, since high past levels of consumption decrease the instantaneous utility level. This, in turn, modifies the optimality conditions and the expression of the risk premium. L'une des critiques habituelles adressées à la fonction d'utilité additive est qu'elle ne permet pas de distinguer l'aversion pour le risque de l'élasticité de substitution intertemporelle; plus exactement le paramètre de l'aversion pour le risque est à la fois l'inverse de l'élasticité de substitution intertemporelle. Cette critique est particulièrement pertinente lorsqu'il s'agit de rendre compte du taux d'intérêt sans risque et de la prime de risque. Mon intérêt dans ce travail est d'incorporer l'hypothèse de formation d'habitudes avec des préférences récursives dans un modèle du facteur d'escompte stochastique. L'idée générale est le fait que l'aversion de risque peut varier avec le temps. Avec une aversion de risque qui n'est pas constante, on peut expliquer la prévisibilité des excès-rendements des actifs risqués. Cette transformation est une bonne candidate capable de produire une aversion de risque temps-variée et qui peut apporter une meilleure performance aux études empiriques.

Suggested Citation

  • Aylin Seckin, 2000. "Habit Formation with Recursive Preferences," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-43, CIRANO.
  • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2000s-43
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    File URL: https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2000s-43.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Benoit Aubert & Michel Patry & Suzanne Rivard & Heather Smith, 2000. "IT Outsourcing Risk Management at British Petroleum," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-31, CIRANO.
    2. Marcel Boyer, 1999. "Les Expos, l'OSM, les universités, les hôpitaux : Le coût d'un déficit de 400 000 emplois au Québec = Expos, Montreal Symphony Orchestra, Universities, Hospitals: The Cost of a 400,000-Job Shortfall i," CIRANO Papers 99c-01, CIRANO.
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    Cited by:

    1. Luo, Yulei & Nie, Jun & Wang, Gaowang & Young, Eric R., 2017. "Rational inattention and the dynamics of consumption and wealth in general equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 55-87.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Recursive preferences; habit formation; risk aversion; Préférences récursives; formation d'habitudes; aversion au risque;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E2 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment
    • G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets

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