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Why Do Experimental Subjects Choose an Equilibrium which Is Neither Payoff Nor Risk Dominant?

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  • Claudia Keser
  • Bodo Vogt

Abstract

In an experimental 2x2 coordination game with two strict equilibria we observe that, in contrast to equilibrium selection theory (Harsanyi and Selten 1988), only half of the subjects choose the strategy that relates to the payoff- and risk-dominant equilibrium. We propose modified risk dominance as an explanation for the observed deviations from payoff and risk dominance. Dans un jeu de coordination expérimental avec deux équilibres stricts nous observons que, contrairement à la théorie de sélection des équilibres (Harsanyi et Selten 1988), seulement la moitié des participants choisissent la stratégie reliée à l'équilibre qui est simultanément dominante par rapport au gain et dominante par rapport au risque. Nous proposons d'utiliser la dominance au risque modifiée comme explication des déviations observées par rapport à la dominance au gain et la dominance au risque.

Suggested Citation

  • Claudia Keser & Bodo Vogt, 2000. "Why Do Experimental Subjects Choose an Equilibrium which Is Neither Payoff Nor Risk Dominant?," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-34, CIRANO.
    • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2000s-34
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    File URL: https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2000s-34.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Benoit Aubert & Michel Patry & Suzanne Rivard & Heather Smith, 2000. "IT Outsourcing Risk Management at British Petroleum," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-31, CIRANO.
    2. Marcel Boyer, 1999. "Les Expos, l'OSM, les universités, les hôpitaux : Le coût d'un déficit de 400 000 emplois au Québec = Expos, Montreal Symphony Orchestra, Universities, Hospitals: The Cost of a 400,000-Job Shortfall i," CIRANO Papers 99c-01, CIRANO.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pope, Robin & Selten, Reinhard & Kube, Sebastian, 2009. "Nominalist Heuristics and Economic Theory," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 17/2009, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    2. Dhritiman Gupta, 2020. "Prize Sharing Rules in Collective Contests: Towards Strategic Foundations," Discussion Papers 20-01, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    3. Jonathan W. Leland, 2006. "Equilibrium Selection, Similarity Judgments and the "Nothing to Gain/Nothing to Lose" Effect," CEEL Working Papers 0604, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    4. von Hagen, Jürgen & Kube, Sebastian & Kaiser, Johannes & Selten, Reinhard & Pope, Robin, 2006. "Prominent Numbers and Ratios in Exchange Rate Determination: Field and Laboratory Evidence," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 29/2006, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    5. Nadja Trhal & Ralf Radermacher, 2006. "Bad luck vs. self-inflicted neediness – An experimental investigation of gift giving in a solidarity game," Working Paper Series in Economics 28, University of Cologne, Department of Economics, revised 07 Mar 2008.
    6. Buettner, Thiess & von Schwerin, Axel, 2016. "Yardstick competition and partial coordination: Exploring the empirical distribution of local business tax rates," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 178-201.
    7. Dimitri Dubois & Marc Willinger & Phu Nguyen Van, 2008. "Optimization incentive and relative riskiness in experimental coordination games," Working Papers 08-19, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Nov 2008.
    8. Thomas Neumann & Bodo Vogt, 2009. "Do Players’ Beliefs or Risk Attitudes Determine The Equilibrium Selections in 2x2 Coordination Games?," FEMM Working Papers 09024, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Equilibrium selection; modified risk dominance; prominence theory; experimental economics; Sélection des équilibres; dominance par rapport au risque modifiée; théorie de la proéminence des nombres; économie expérimentale;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General

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