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Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies

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  • Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt
  • Christian Wey

Abstract

We analyze evidence production in merger control as a delegation problem in an inquisitorial competition policy system. The antitrust agency’s incentives to produce evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal depend critically on its action set. Allowing for a compromising remedy solution reduces information acquisition incentives, and could therefore reduce consumer welfare. The effort-frustrating effect of the remedy solution can be eliminated if a remedy solution can be implemented only after evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal has been produced.

Suggested Citation

  • Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt & Christian Wey, 2021. "Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies," CESifo Working Paper Series 8915, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8915
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    Cited by:

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    2. Budzinski, Oliver & Haucap, Justus, 2019. "Kartellrecht und Ökonomik: Institutions matter!," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 102, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    3. Andreea Cosnita‐Langlais & Jean‐Philippe Tropeano, 2023. "Merger selection, evidence provision, and the timing of merger control," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(1), pages 209-222, January.
    4. Céline Bonnet & Jan Philip Schain, 2020. "An Empirical Analysis Of Mergers: Efficiency Gains And Impact On Consumer Prices," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(1), pages 1-35.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    merger remedies; merger control; antitrust;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law

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