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Institutions, Shared Guilt, and Moral Transgression

Author

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  • Dominik Rothenhäusler
  • Nikolaus Schweizer
  • Nora Szech

Abstract

Many tasks can only be completed if several people contribute. Likewise, many institutions, e.g. voting rules, require the support of several people to implement specific decisions. In such situations, individual costs from supporting may decrease in the number of supporters. This holds true for physical costs in division of labor. Psychological, sociological and economic evidence suggests that also moral costs due to feelings of guilt or having a bad conscience diffuse. This paper analyzes the influence of diffusion of costs in threshold public good games under incomplete information, and compares predictions to those when costs do not diffuse.

Suggested Citation

  • Dominik Rothenhäusler & Nikolaus Schweizer & Nora Szech, 2015. "Institutions, Shared Guilt, and Moral Transgression," CESifo Working Paper Series 5525, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5525
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    Cited by:

    1. Kirchkamp, Oliver & Strobel, Christina, 2019. "Sharing responsibility with a machine," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 25-33.
    2. Choo, Lawrence & Grimm, Veronika & Horváth, Gergely & Nitta, Kohei, 2019. "Whistleblowing and diffusion of responsibility: An experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 287-301.
    3. Rothenhäusler, Dominik & Schweizer, Nikolaus & Szech, Nora, 2018. "Guilt in voting and public good games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 664-681.
    4. David Smerdon & Theo Offerman & Uri Gneezy, 2020. "‘Everybody’s doing it’: on the persistence of bad social norms," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(2), pages 392-420, June.
    5. Dufwenberg, Martin & Patel, Amrish, 2017. "Reciprocity networks and the participation problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 260-272.
    6. Binzel, Christine & Fehr, Dietmar, 2013. "Giving and sorting among friends: Evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 214-217.
    7. Vieider, Ferdinand M. & Cingl, Lubomír & Martinsson, Peter & Stojic, Hrvoje, 2013. "Separating attitudes towards money from attitudes towards probabilities: Stake effects and ambiguity as a test for prospect theory," Discussion Papers, WZB Junior Research Group Risk and Development SP II 2013-401, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    8. Falk, Armin & Szech, Nora, 2015. "Institutions and morals: A reply," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 391-394.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    moral decision making; division of labor; shared guilt; diffusion of responsibility; institutions and morals; committee decisions; moral transgression;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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