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Organizations, Diffused Pivotality and Immoral Outcomes

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  • Armin Falk
  • Nora Szech

Abstract

This paper studies how organizational design affects moral outcomes. Subjects face the decision to either kill mice for money or to save mice. We compare a Baseline treatment where subjects are fully pivotal to a Diffused-Pivotality treatment where subjects simultaneously choose in groups of eight. In the latter condition eight mice are killed if at least one subject opts for killing. The fraction of subjects deciding to kill is higher when pivotality is diffused. The likelihood of killing is monotone in subjective perceptions of pivotality. On an aggregate level many more mice are killed in Diffused-Pivotality than Baseline.

Suggested Citation

  • Armin Falk & Nora Szech, 2013. "Organizations, Diffused Pivotality and Immoral Outcomes," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1305, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1305
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bartling, Björn & Fischbacher, Urs & Schudy, Simeon, 2015. "Pivotality and responsibility attribution in sequential voting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 133-139.
    2. Roman Inderst & Kiryl Khalmetski & Axel Ockenfels, 2019. "Sharing Guilt: How Better Access to Information May Backfire," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(7), pages 3322-3336, July.
    3. Rothenhäusler, Dominik & Schweizer, Nikolaus & Szech, Nora, 2013. "Institutions, shared guilt, and moral transgression," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2013-305, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    4. Deckers, Thomas & Falk, Armin & Kosse, Fabian & Szech, Nora, 2016. "Homo moralis: Personal characteristics, institutions, and moral decision-making," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2016-302, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    5. Dugar, Subhasish & Mitra, Arnab & Shahriar, Quazi, 2019. "Deception: The role of uncertain consequences," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 1-18.
    6. Felix Koelle & Lukas Wenner, 2018. "Present-Biased Generosity: Time Inconsistency across Individual and Social Contexts," Discussion Papers 2018-02, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    7. Exley, Christine L. & Petrie, Ragan, 2018. "The impact of a surprise donation ask," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 152-167.
    8. Hajdu, Gergely, 2024. "Excusing Beliefs about Third-party Success," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 362, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
    9. Christine L. Exley, 2015. "Excusing Selfishness in Charitable Giving: The Role of Risk," Discussion Papers 15-013, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    10. Christine L. Exley, 2020. "Using Charity Performance Metrics as an Excuse Not to Give," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(2), pages 553-563, February.
    11. Kölle, Felix & Wenner, Lukas, 2019. "Time-Inconsistent Generosity: Present Bias across Individual and Social Contexts," VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy 203505, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    12. Christine L. Exley & Judd Kessler, 2017. "The Better is the Enemy of the Good," Working Papers 2017-068, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
    13. Falk, Armin & Szech, Nora, 2015. "Institutions and morals: A reply," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 391-394.
    14. Christine L. Exley & Judd B. Kessler, 2018. "Equity Concerns are Narrowly Framed," NBER Working Papers 25326, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Morality; pivotality; experiment; organization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
    • D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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