On the optimality of a duty-to-rescue rule and the cost of wrongful intervention
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DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2011.08.002
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- Dominik Rothenhäusler & Nikolaus Schweizer & Nora Szech, 2015. "Institutions, Shared Guilt, and Moral Transgression," CESifo Working Paper Series 5525, CESifo.
- Szech, Nora & Rothenhäusler, Dominik & Schweizer, Nikolaus, 2014. "Institutions, Shared Guilt, and Moral Transgression," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100518, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Rothenhäusler, Dominik & Schweizer, Nikolaus & Szech, Nora, 2013. "Institutions, shared guilt, and moral transgression," Working Paper Series in Economics 47, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
- Rothenhäusler, Dominik & Schweizer, Nikolaus & Szech, Nora, 2018.
"Guilt in voting and public good games,"
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- Dominik Rothenhaüsler & Nikolaus Schweizer & Nora Szech, 2016. "Guilt in Voting and Public Good Games," Working Papers 2016-026, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
- Rothenhäusler, Dominik & Schweizer, Nikolaus & Szech, Nora, 2016. "Guilt in voting and public good games," Working Paper Series in Economics 99, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
- Friehe, Tim & Tabbach, Avraham, 2018. "A comparison of simple action-based and outcome-based policies for emergency-like situations," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 22-34.
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Keywords
Bystander effect; Duty to rescue;JEL classification:
- K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
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