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Whistleblowing and diffusion of responsibility: An experiment

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  • Choo, Lawrence
  • Grimm, Veronika
  • Horváth, Gergely
  • Nitta, Kohei

Abstract

In this paper we examine diffusion of responsibility in a whistleblowing experiment. We use a multi-player asymmetric information ultimatum game where only the proposer and a subset of the responders (the information insiders) know the size of a pot that the proposer distributes among information insiders and outsiders. Insiders have a clear monetary incentive to whistleblow in case of a small pot in order to avoid rejection of seemingly unfair offers by outsiders; in case of a large pot only altruistic motives could explain that insiders whistleblow. We vary the number of information insiders, one or two, who can whistleblow. We find that in all treatments close to 60% of the insiders whistleblow when they are pivotal for both small and large pots. In a treatment where other insider can also blow the whistle, we observe a significant drop in case only altruistic motives can explain whistleblowing. We show that the effect is due to the extensive margin, i.e. the share of whistleblowers drops to 20%, while patterns of active whistleblowers do not change. In case of low pot sizes, where whistleblowing is in line with selfish motives, we do not observe diffusion of responsibility, in spite of a possible free riding incentive due to a positive cost of whistleblowing.

Suggested Citation

  • Choo, Lawrence & Grimm, Veronika & Horváth, Gergely & Nitta, Kohei, 2019. "Whistleblowing and diffusion of responsibility: An experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 287-301.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:119:y:2019:i:c:p:287-301
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.07.010
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    Cited by:

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    2. Sebastian Krügel & Matthias Uhl, 2023. "Internal whistleblowing systems without proper sanctions may backfire," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 93(8), pages 1355-1383, October.
    3. Behnk, Sascha & Hao, Li & Reuben, Ernesto, 2022. "Shifting normative beliefs: On why groups behave more antisocially than individuals," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    4. Castillo, Geoffrey & Choo, Lawrence & Grimm, Veronika, 2022. "Are groups always more dishonest than individuals? The case of salient negative externalities," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 198(C), pages 598-611.
    5. Olayinka Erin & Omololu Adex Bamigboye, 2020. "Does whistleblowing framework influence earnings management? An empirical investigation," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 17(2), pages 111-122, September.
    6. Guerra, Alice & Zhuravleva, Tatyana, 2021. "Do bystanders react to bribery?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 442-462.
    7. Antinyan, Armenak & Corazzini, Luca & Pavesi, Filippo, 2020. "Does trust in the government matter for whistleblowing on tax evaders? Survey and experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 77-95.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Whistleblowing; Diffusion of responsibility; Pro-social behaviours;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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