Corporate Governance Reforms, Interlocking Directorship Networks and Company Value in Italy (1998-2007)
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- Xavier Hollandts & Daniela Borodak & Ariane Tichit, 2018.
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- Xavier Hollandts & Daniela Borodak & Ariane Tichit, 2018. "La dynamique de changement des formes de gouvernance : le cas français (2000-2014)," Post-Print hal-02022915, HAL.
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- Carlo Drago & Livia Amidani Aliberti & Davide Carbonai, 2014.
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- Drago, Carlo & Amidani Aliberti, Livia & Carbonai, Davide, 2014. "Measuring Gender Differences in Information Sharing Using Network Analysis: the Case of the Austrian Interlocking Directorship Network in 2009," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 178241, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Andrea Fracasso & Valentina Peruzzi & Chiara Tomasi, 2024.
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- Giovanni Bartolomeo & Paolo Canofari, 2015.
"Interlocking Directorates and Concentration in the Italian Insurance Market,"
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 351-362, December.
- Canofari Paolo & Di Bartolomeo Giovanni, 2015. "Interlocking directorates and concentration in the Italian insurance market," wp.comunite 0115, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
- Carlo Drago & Francesco Millo & Roberto Ricciuti & Paolo Satella, 2011. "The Role of Women in the Italian Network of Boards of Directors, 2003-2010," Working Papers 10/2011, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
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- Su Kun & Liu Heng, 2019. "The Effect of Interlocking Director Network on Corporate Risk Taking: Lessons from China," Entrepreneurship Research Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-21, January.
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More about this item
Keywords
corporate governance; interlocking directorships; company performance; social network analysis;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C14 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
- C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics
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